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Introduction 
Civil religion is a necessary unifying force in a religiously plural society such as the 
United States, but it can also usurp the place of Christianity in the believer’s life. This is always a 
danger for Christianity which is can only be the “good news” if it is inculturated by drawing 
upon a society’s own symbols. But it must also transcend the culture if it is to speak a prophetic 
word to it. Ever since Bellah’s article about civil religion in America, there has been 
disagreement about the theological value of civil religion. Reinhold Niebuhr, James McEvoy and 
Will Herberg have argued that civil religion will inevitably replace transcendent religion in 
people’s lives. Bellah, John F. Wilson and others argue instead that civil religion is necessary to 
develop the social bonds that hold modern secular societies together. Civil religion produces 
patriotism, a devotion and attachment to one’s country, which is an important source of civic and 
communal identity. However, patriotism can also become idolatrous when that love becomes 
one’s most important commitment.  
American politics often fuses with the broader American civil religion that quietly 
underlies the national identity. Even as politicians pay rhetorical lip service to the importance of 
religion in the private sphere (especially Christianity), these same religious communities often 
have a difficult time standing up to the American civil religion that promotes the moral 
righteousness of all American military conflicts abroad, the expansion of democracy and neo-
liberal economic policies around the world, and the unifying rhetoric of a nationalism that pits 
“true Americans” against ethnic or religious minorities.  Identifying this civil religion as the 
primary religion of the United States is controversial and requires one to identify the hidden 
assumptions behind the political rhetoric that often co-opts Christianity’s own religious symbols.  
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When the political state is the ultimate focus of one’s loyalty, then the state takes the 
place that God should hold in a Christian’s life. Instead of a universal Gospel, this nationalism 
supports a civic religion for which political boundaries both enforce and symbolize the inside-
outside dialectic typical of any religious community. But in this case, the “insiders” are the “true 
Americans.” John Courtney Murray, S.J., succeeds in both identifying this danger and showing 
how the American experiment can avoid it. We are a country founded upon the political 
separation of Church and state and the sovereignty of God as the “first principle of its 
organization.”1 Murray uses natural law theology to support his thesis that the American 
consensus, because it is based upon truths about the human person that are universally accessible 
to human reason, can serve as this necessary and unifying force within the political community.  
 H. Richard Niebuhr concluded at the end of his Christ and Culture that a viable model 
for this relationship between faith and culture was “Christ, Transformer of Culture.” The 
problem with that type is that it can easily slide into a Messianic nationalism. Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s preferred model was “Christ and Culture in Paradox,” which acknowledges religion’s 
important role in public life but, at the same time, acknowledges the imperfect character of all 
human institutions. However, Christianity must always exist within a particular culture and it is 
only from within a culture that Christianity then interacts with the culture. Specifically, the role 
of the Church is to be both be a prophetic voice that critiques the culture but also an animating 
force within it. Any theological model must balance this tension between religion and culture. It 
is a paradoxical tension precisely because religious faith can never stand outside of the culture 
that it opposes. 
                                                 
1 John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition (New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005) 44. 
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Bellah, Herberg and Albanese lay out the American civil religion and its history of 
interactions with a plurality of denominations and belief systems. But their projects are 
descriptive, while Niebuhr’s is proscriptive. Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture helps to articulate and 
evaluate how Christianity should relate to the secular culture in the United States today. This 
approach assumes that theology is already a political discipline and asks questions that center 
around public theology. Specifically, how should the Catholic Church relate to secular American 
society as a public institution? Theology and religious commitments should not merely be 
private enterprises that concern themselves only with the individual and his or her relationship to 
God. Rather, the Church is already contextualized within a history and a society, and it is to that 
history and society which the Church must speak a word of hope.  
Theologians such as J.B. Metz reject the modern belief that theology has no role to play 
in a secular society and should be limited to the private sphere. At the same time, Metz does not 
want to revert to a pre-modern era in which the theological, governmental and social structures 
were tightly intertwined. Many of the important contributions of the Enlightenment can be 
preserved while critiquing other parts of the ideology. Theology and the Church are already 
contextualized within a social ideology, but the consciousness of that a priori contextualization 
can then allow Christians to critique that ideology from a standpoint of faith. 
This critical project is particularly viable in the United States where a history of the 
political separation between Church and State has protected the churches rather than 
marginalized them. Metz comes from a European context in which people were born into a 
national Catholic Church, so his concern is to maintain theology’s public nature while preserving 
its rightful sphere of influence as distinct from the political sphere. The United States, however, 
is considered one of the most religious countries in the West precisely because its freedom of 
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religion has allowed so many different denominations to flourish. American civil religion is 
political because it unifies the citizens of the country, but it is also built upon New England 
Puritanism and Enlightenment Deism. It arose alongside the churches and, rather than replacing 
them, has subsumed the churches under an umbrella of American identity.  
Metz offers a negative understanding of the role of theology which prevents any inner-
worldly ideology, such as Marxism, from being absolutized. A Christian must not create a God 
out of human projects.  Thus, theology cannot offer a divinely sanctioned plan for history. It is 
important to maintain the distinction between the ecclesiological and the political realms, but 
Metz does not offer a positive and substantive understanding of the Church's role in the modern 
world. It is to typologies such as H. Richard Niebuhr's that one must turn for a more coherent 
and systematic description of the possible kinds of interactions between these two spheres.   
 In chapter 1, I will defend the proposition that the United States does indeed have a civil 
religion and identify some of its main characteristics, and I will layout the two main sides within 
which my thesis falls—that a civil religion is both necessary and a threat to Christian faith. This 
will not be a forensic argument that traces the development of civil religion through history. I am 
mainly interested in arguing how it exists now, and I will use concrete examples of this civil 
religion: the symbolic power of the office of the President as a national high priest and the co-
opting of Christian religious language into political rhetoric.  
 In chapter 2, using Christ and Culture, I will argue for a specific type of relationship 
between Christianity and civil religion so that neither one supplants the other. The nature and 
role of Christianity is as a public religion that must interact with the national, civil religion. This 
interaction must be further specified and explored. Should Christianity place itself primarily 
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outside culture as a critique of that culture, or seek to transform culture from within? To what 
extent can and should it do both?  
 Finally, in chapter 3, I will argue that the “Christ the Transformer of Culture” model is 
what underlies Gaudium et Spes and the ecclesiological shift from a synthesist model of the 
interaction between the Church and culture. At Vatican II, the Church found itself both resisting 
with the rise of secularity and embracing the separation of Church and State after the 
Enlightenment. Rather than completely reject the surrounding culture, Gaudium et Spes  
encouraged the Church to dialogue with the culture, to acknowledge what cultural developments 
were movements of the Holy Spirit and to work with all people to builder a more just and 
humane world. In the midst of a liberal and secular society, the Church could no longer afford to 
be completely withdrawn from the culture and consequently irrelevant to it; but it also could not 
be too relevant by completely capitulating to the surrounding culture and thus lose its own 
identity in the process. 
 I will conclude by gesturing toward other implications of my argument for the 
contemporary debate around immigration. In that case, there is a fundamental disagreement 
about the nature and role of the Christian Church in a pluralistic civil society as both a prophetic 
voice from outside society and a transformative voice within it. In a pluralistic society that values 
democracy, it is important that the civil society not be governed by any one religious sect. If the 
Church is to be more than a place of worship within a secular world, then it must understand 
both its mission and its limits within that society. “Christ the Transformer of Culture” model is at 
articulating the balance that the Church needs to strike with today’s pluralistic, secular culture.  
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Chapter 1: America and Its Idols, “a religion of…many of the people some of the time” 
The seal of the United States of America depicts an eagle with a scroll in its beak bearing 
the motto “E Pluribus Unum” (“from many, one”). But what is less well-known is what is on the 
reverse side of the seal: an unfinished pyramid surrounded, at the top, by the Latin statement 
“Annuit Coeptis” (“[he] favors [our] undertakings”) and, at the bottom, “Novus Ordo Seclorum 
(“a new order of the ages”). Other proposals for a seal, eventually rejected, were Franklin’s 
“Moses lifting up his wand and dividing the Red Sea…with the motto ‘Rebellion to tyrants is 
obedience to God’” and Jefferson’s “the children of Israel in the wilderness ‘led by a cloud by 
day and  pillar of fire at night.’”2 Although the founders eventually settled on a seal that was less 
overtly Christian than these other proposals, it is clear that Christian symbolism informed how 
the founders interpreted this new American experiment. The seals suggested by Franklin and 
Jefferson show that many colonists viewed the new American nation as a “New Israel” being led 
out of captivity by God—a traditional biblical image that hearkened back to John Winthrop and 
his image of the new Puritan settlement as a “city set on a hill” that would be a beacon of hope to 
Europe.3 
 The founders of the United States were Deists, but they were influenced by a culture of 
Protestant Christianity that was transplanted from the European continent. Just how influential 
Christianity was remains an open question, particularly as one examines the intersections of 
American politics and religious belief. Does the United States have a “civil religion” in any 
substantive sense of that word? Is the civil religion, if it exists, merely synonymous with 
                                                 
2 Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 96:1 (1967): 20, fn 5. 
3 John F. Wilson, Public Religion in American Culture (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1979), 29.  
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Protestantism, is it a differentiated religion in and of itself, or is it a set of cultural values that 
undergird particular religious expressions such as Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism?  
What is Religion?  
 However, before looking at these questions, we must first quickly examine what we mean 
by the words “culture” and “religion.” All societies are predicated upon and require a 
“community of meaning” in which there is a consensus on at least some fundamental beliefs, 
attitudes, values and expected ways of acting.4 Culture is thus the foundation of all social order. 
But at the same time, it is precisely because it is below the surface of consciousness that culture 
is so difficult to describe. No society is without conflict because cultures change over time and 
people within a society must re-negotiate these shared beliefs. But what is constant is that one is 
born into and internalizes a specific culture from childhood.  
 The sociologist Emile Durkheim stretched the notion of culture to include a broad 
understanding of “religion.” Durkheim famously declared that religion was a “fundamental and 
permanent aspect of humanity.”5 As an eminently social thing, religion is both constitutive of 
society and arises out of those same social relations. Society and religion are logically distinct 
but inseparable in reality. These insights led him to his definition of religion which will also 
guide this investigation: “a religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred 
things…which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to 
                                                 
4 Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1997), 32.  
5 Emile Durkehim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Trans. Karen E. Fields (New York: The Free Press, 
1995), 1.  
 
 
 
8 
 
them.”6 This is a very functionalist definition which describes a fundamental unifying force in all 
societies.  
 Rather than thinking about religion as a differentiated subset of culture, Durkheim 
reverses the equation and makes culture a consequence of religion. As a unifying force within 
society, religion is constitutive of the shared beliefs, values, and practices that support social 
cooperation. Furthermore, as an anthropologist, Durkheim was concerned first with observable 
rites and practices rather than cognitive beliefs: 
There can be no society that does not experience the need at regular intervals to maintain 
and strengthen the collective feelings and ideas that provide its coherence and its distinct 
individuality.7 
 
These practices oriented toward sacred things are what give rise to the collective ideas and 
feelings, for it is “through common action that society becomes conscious of and affirms itself, 
society is above all an active cooperation.”8 These practices, both mental and physical, thus form 
both society and the individuals within that society. Religion, then, is characterized by shared 
social practices that presuppose a world classified into sacred and profane realms.9 Each 
“homogenous group of sacred things” then constitute an “organizational center” around which 
“gravitates a set of beliefs and rites, a cult of its own.”10 The distinguishing characteristic of 
religion is not worship of a deity or orientation toward the supernatural, but its orientation toward 
things in the world that are set apart. 
                                                 
6 Ibid., 44.  
7 Ibid., 429.  
8 Ibid., 421.  
9 Ibid., 34.  
10 Ibid., 38.  
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 Durkheim’s definition of religion both simplifies our investigation in some ways and 
complicates it in others. On the one hand, Durkheim’s theory suggests that America does have 
some kind of underlying and unifying religious structure that should manifest primarily in 
actions. On the other hand, his definition of religion is predicated upon an absolute separation 
between the profane and the sacred realms. There is a fundamental duality inherent to religious 
worldviews that can even reach the point of antagonism, such as in monasticism where believers 
try to escape from the profane world.11 This aspect of the model does not fit the modern context 
of the United States. If civil religion exists, it is clearly part of the warp and woof of the ordinary 
culture rather than a separate sphere that requires the mediation of a priest. Durkheim’s theory 
was based upon aboriginal Australian societies in which religion and society were coterminous. 
In our post-Enlightenment, secular context, we must adjust our understanding of the role of a 
society’s religious force to account for this separation of civil society from religious belief. 
 One helpful distinction in this regard is Albanese’s distinction between “ordinary” 
religion and “extraordinary” religion. Ordinary religion is synonymous with culture and “shows 
people how to live well within boundaries.”12 It reinforces social bonds and corresponds well 
with Durkheim’s understanding of religion as a unifying social force. Ordinary religion is 
difficult to describe because it is always in the background and is simply “how the world is.” 
Extraordinary religion, on the other hand, is outside the ordinary social arrangements and is most 
often what people identify as “religion.” Extraordinary religion involves an “encounter with 
some form of otherness, whether natural or supernatural.”13 Ordinary religion is diffused 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 37.  
12 Catherine L. Albanese, America:  Religions and Religion. 2nd ed (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
1992), 6.  
13 Ibid.,7. 
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throughout a culture, while extraordinary religion is condensed.14 At this point, Albanese is 
slightly modifying Durkheim’s understanding because ordinary religion will still have its 
“condensed” moments: special rites that “maintain and strengthen the collective feelings and 
ideas” that allow society to cohere together. But these condensed social rites, because they are 
part of the normal texture of culture, often do not stand out as specifically religious activities. 
Extraordinary religious rites, however, encourage special language and ways of thinking that are 
distinct from the surrounding culture precisely because their purpose is to reach beyond that 
culture to a transcendent reality.15 
All religion, according to Durkheim, is centered around this absolute distinction between 
the sacred and the profane. Even what Albanese calls ordinary religion possesses concentrated 
rituals oriented to something “sacred” or “set apart.” In this respect, ordinary religion is no 
different than extraordinary religion. These rituals, however, connect two spheres of reality that 
are not stringently separate in ordinary life. For example, a Presidential inauguration has the 
trappings of a high Mass and a religious experience. At the same time, the President is covered 
extensively by the media and critiqued by the public. During these normal times, whatever 
sacred sphere that was accessed during the inauguration has become joined to the profane. In this 
way, American civil religion, because of the character of our secular culture and separation 
between church and state, has both elements of Durkheim’s and Albanese’s models. American 
civil religion is centered around the sacred through rituals that unify society. However, these 
rituals are also part of an ordinary, everyday culture in which the sacred and profane are not 
separated to the extent that Durkheim observed in the Australian aboriginal societies.  
                                                 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid., 7.  
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In this light, Clifford Geertz’s definition of religion is the most helpful for our purposes 
because it includes both of these examples of ordinary and extraordinary religion. Geertz states: 
A religion is a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-
lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of 
existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods 
and motivations seem uniquely realistic. 
 
Geertz’s definition does not focus solely on actions, but on “concrete embodiments of ideas, 
attitudes, judgments, longings, or beliefs.”16 These symbols produce “moods and motivations” in 
reaction to placing the experience within a larger “cosmic framework” of what is most real.17 
Religious symbols interpret the world in a very specific way by relating the person’s 
existence to “a wider sphere within which it is conceived to rest.”18 This specifically religious 
perspective can be differentiated from other kinds of perspectives such as the “common-sensical, 
the scientific, and the aesthetic” which all construe the world differently.19 For example, the 
experience of a sunset is aesthetically interpreted if the person is absorbed in the beauty of the 
event itself. A religious perspective, however, would relate the sunset to the “really real” such as 
to a larger cosmic creation myth that explains why the sun sets every 24 hours.20 Unlike the 
scientific perspective which is based upon systematic doubt, the religious perspective always 
appeals to an authority—such as a myth or divinely revealed scriptures—that covers the 
conceptions of the “really real” with an “aura of factuality.”21 Rather than the “common-
sensical” perspective marked by “simple acceptance of the world…as being just what” it seems 
                                                 
16 Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a Cultural System,” The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973) 
91.  
17 Ibid., 98.  
18 Ibid., 108.  
19 Ibid., 111.  
20 Ibid., 112.  
21 Ibid., 112.  
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to be, the religious perspective interprets reality in an ultimate context: “charity becomes 
Christian charity when it is enclosed in a conception of God’s purposes.”22 
 Geertz’s definition of religion incorporates both the “sudden eruptions of extraordinary 
events” which engender religious interpretation, but also the more common “persistent, 
constantly re-experienced difficulty” of interpreting the world from the other perspectives. These 
problems of meaning, such as inexplicable suffering, often motivate a religious interpretation of 
one’s experiences. Religion is not limited to only the “ordinary” or the “extraordinary” events of 
life. In this way, Geertz can incorporate the fusing of the profane and the sacred realms which 
Durkheim’s definition does not allow. Geertz’s definition is most amenable to seeing the 
presence of civil religion in America, and it is to the history of that phenomenon that we now 
turn.    
What is Civil Religion? 
The United States’ experiment in the separation between church and state set the context 
for one of the most religiously pluralistic cultures to develop in the modern world. Religion—
traditionally a unifying force in political society—has also served as a differentiating and, at 
times, divisive force within that same society. These questions are explored in Will Herberg’s 
Protestant-Catholic-Jew. Herberg, examining the sociological data from the 1950’s, concludes 
that the “American Way of Life” functions as a common set of values in the culture which get 
expressed primarily as one of the three main religious denominations: Protestantism, Catholicism 
and Judaism.23 Robert Bellah famously called this set of values a “civil religion” andshowed how 
Americans had their own creed, code and cult that possessed many of the same features as the 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 111,98. 
23 Will Herberg, Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1960), 77.  
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Christian religion.24 However, Bellah’s analysis was ambiguous and vacillated between viewing 
civil religion as a differentiated religion in society and as a subconscious set of values and 
cultural orientations shared by the majority of the culture. Finally, Catherine Albanese in her text 
shows how Protestantism, “civil religion” and a “cultural religion” have all contributed to 
providing civic and cultural unity in American society.25 Her analysis is the most nuanced and 
sophisticated of the three because it separates some of the threads that contribute to the idea of an 
American “civil religion.” Rather than portraying civil religion merely as a common set of values 
(à la Herberg) or presenting it as its own differentiated religious system (à la Bellah), Albanese 
attempts to do justice to both positions and examine the complexity of the topic. She also traces 
how Protestantism was the de facto civil religion for much of American history. This is a point 
appreciated by Herberg, ignored by Bellah and fleshed out in greater detail by Albanese. In the 
end, one can conclude that there is a “civil religion” in America but precisely what that concept 
has meant has varied greatly through this country’s history.  
 Herberg has some very important insights in his analysis of immigrant experiences and 
their transplantation of religious identities from Europe to the New World. In Europe the 
immigrants identified themselves by their local village, but the American culture did not make 
such distinctions and instead grouped them together according to language. Eventually, rather 
than identify themselves as "Apulians or Sicilians," the immigrants began to identify themselves 
by culture and eventually nationality—Poles, Italians, Germans.26 This was also the start of the 
ethnic churches in America in which first generation immigrants found some continuity with 
                                                 
24 Bellah, 4. 
25 Albanese, 395.  
26 Herberg, 13-14. 
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their lives back in the Old World.27 But far from a uniform "melting pot," instead the cultural 
assimilation of the immigrants was a "transmuting pot" that changed the succeeding generations 
more and more into an "idealized 'Anglo-Saxon' model."28 Thus second-generation immigrants 
found themselves "at the boundary" as mediators between the foreign cultures of their parents 
and the surrounding American culture.29 As "doubly alienated, marginal men," many would 
reject their cultural heritage and religion altogether.30  
 As long as new immigrants kept coming, this turning away of the second generation had 
little impact on the larger society, but the cessation of immigration in 1924 served to amplify the 
effects not of the second generation but of the third generation.31 Herberg repeats Marcus 
Hansen's pithy insight to explain this new social phenomenon, that "what the son wishes to 
forget, the grandson wishes to remember."32 Rather than feeling culturally displaced, the 
members of the third generation instead sought to recapture the heritage of their grandparents. 
However, as American-born children of immigrants, the "old-line ethnic group, with its foreign 
language and culture, was not for them."33 What they did recover was the religion of their 
grandparents, but made "genuinely American" by replacing the ethnic language with English.34 
In the process of "recovering" their heritage, what they actually recovered was an Americanized 
source of group identification. What emerged with the third generation was a "new and unique 
social structure" called the "religious community."35 Religious association became the primary 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 16. 
28 Ibid., 21. 
29 Ibid., 17. 
30 Ibid., 16. 
31 Ibid., 30. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 31. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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identity marker for members of the third generation, for most of the second generation and more 
generally for an entire nation of immigrants.36 This  religiously-based social identification 
increasingly fell into one of three main religious categories: Protestants, Catholics and Jews.37 
 Herberg characterizes America as a "triple melting plot" in which each of three major 
religions are considered "equally and authentically American" because they are all particular 
manifestations of the "American Way of Life."38 This "common religion" is not a differentiated, 
positive religion in the sense of the three religious communities, but instead is a "spiritual 
structure" of "ideas and ideals, of aspirations and values, of beliefs and standards."39 It is the 
"operative faith of the American people" which includes the uniquely American axiomatic 
principle of religious pluralism: the belief that the diversity of religions and churches in society 
is a good thing.40 For this reason, Herbert is critical that they have become "integrated as parts 
within a larger whole defined by the ‘American Way of Life’” and reduced merely to the 
particular means of promoting "ideals and standards that all Americans are expected to share on 
a deeper level."41 It is this general sense of religion that is behind President Eisenhower's 
statement that "our government makes no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious 
faith--and I don't care what it is."42 The immigrants to America are expected to give up most of 
their culture, their language and their ethnic identity as they assimilate into the melting pot. 
However, because of the cultural value of religious pluralism, the immigrants are not expected to 
give up their religion (as long as it falls under one of the three main religious communities). 
                                                 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 39,78. 
39 Ibid., 75. 
40 Ibid., 75,85. 
41 Ibid., 82. 
42 Ibid., 84. 
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Religious identification has become the immigrant's identifying marker which locates him within 
American society. Rather than being a divisive feature of American society, the diversity of 
religious beliefs and practices are unified under the umbrella of the “American Way of Life.” 
This umbrella serves as an essential unifying feature of American society and culture.  
 The "American Way of Life" can be understood as a type of "secularized Puritanism" in 
which originally Puritan values of idealism, moralism, activism, individualism, emotionalism, 
simplicity and pragmatism became co-opted as authentically American values that are shared 
across the religious spectrum.43 Protestantism in its many denominational forms was the primary 
religion of the colonists and, primarily through its practices of revivalism, succeeded as a 
"religion of the disinherited" that appealed to the lower social strata who were gradually 
conquering the western frontiers.44 By the beginning of the 20th century, the identification of 
Protestantism with the American Way of Life was almost complete.45 Catholicism and Judaism 
would try to differentiate themselves from Protestantism in order to attract and retain members, 
but they too were Americanized and took on the Protestant cultural values of American society. 
For example, the average American Catholic absorbed the pluralism of the culture and believed 
that his church was merely one among several, despite the Vatican's insistence that the Catholic 
Church was the one, true church.46 This reflected the secular context of the United States. Unlike 
in Europe where there existed national churches, all religious communities in the new world 
were voluntary associations. This phenomenon, later labeled denominationalism, has 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 81. 
44 Ibid., 103. Such "religions of the disinherited" included Baptists, Methodists and Disciples of Christ. 
45 Ibid., 110. 
46 Ibid., 151. Herberg highlights the role of John Courtney Murray, S.J., as an American Catholic who would 
influence the Church about this issue at the Second Vatican Council.  
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characterized the religious milieu of the country since colonial times.47 By sharing such universal 
cultural values, the faiths could accommodate themselves to America.  
One example of this interaction, Millennialism, is an important Protestant belief that 
influences American culture even today. As a theological concept, millennialism is tied to the 
book of Revelation and the expectation of a new age in which God will rule the earth. This 
concept influenced the Puritan understanding of their colonial origins as settling in a New 
Israel.48 Culturally, this same idea would express itself, not in reference to God, but in reference 
to America as a land of great promise and hope. This American exceptionalism would motivate 
the nation’s westward expansion and influence the self-understanding of many Americans who 
believed they were entering a new age of technological and cultural advancement.49 This secular 
millennialism mixed with theological postmillennialism, the belief that Jesus would return after 
the millennium had arrived through the “Spirit working in the church.”50 Many postmillennial 
Protestants interpreted the advancement of American territory, culture and scientific knowledge 
in the 19th century as evidence that the millennium was beginning. They viewed their role in the 
world as one of spreading the gospel and improving the human condition in order to hasten the 
coming of the millennium.51 It is easy to see how such theological beliefs became incorporated 
into the political rhetoric of the civil religion. It is a short leap from theological postmillennial 
expectation to political rhetoric that articulates a divine mission to spread democracy and liberty 
                                                 
47 Albanese, 10. 
48 Ibid., 427.  
49 Ibid., 427. 
50 Ibid., 425. 
51 Ibid.  
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around the world. This mission would be a major impetus for Manifest Destiny in the 19th 
century and for the great “American century” at the end of World War II.  
 Because Protestantism was the main influence upon American civil religion, for much of 
the country’s history many Americans viewed Catholics with a mixture of suspicion and 
hostility. Catholic immigrants constantly struggled to claim their identity as Americans while not 
abandoning their religious commitments. It was not until the election of John F. Kennedy, and 
the writings of John Courtney Murray, when the majority of Americans began to view 
Catholicism as fully compatible with the American Way of Life. Just as Calvinism drew upon its 
religious tradition as its adherents came together as “Americans,” so too did Murray draw on 
Catholicism’s rich tradition of the natural law. The Founding Fathers “built better than they 
knew” by understanding that a “democracy is more than a political experiment; it is a spiritual 
and moral enterprise.”52 Rather than rights originating from the State, the Founding Fathers 
believed that a Providential God was the source of all rights. Americans possess certain self-
evident, natural rights because they are a people and not because they are citizens. This 
“universal moral law” is the social glue that binds the American political community and 
governs it.53 
 Herberg briefly discusses, but fails to develop, his construct of the “American Way of 
Life” as a differentiated civil religion. Herberg comes very close to identifying the American 
Way of Life with a “civic religion” that sanctifies the society and culture which it reflects.54 
Certainly the American Way of Life includes commitment to democracy, the Constitution, free 
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enterprise and egalitarianism.55 These attitudes tend to make Americans moralistic in their 
worldview to such an extent that if America has a civil religion, then the President is the high 
priest who leads America in its divine mission to bring “democracy and free enterprise” around 
the globe.56 But ultimately he does not develop this into a full-fledged theory of a civil religion 
that centers its worship in the political community itself and is institutionalized in specific ways. 
Instead, Herberg retreats to his view that Americans primarily believe in “religion itself” and in 
the redemptive act of believing in something—they have a “faith in faith.”57 
 Herberg does a masterful job at locating an inchoate sense of a common religion that 
underlies the major religious traditions in American society. But he mostly ignores the 
contribution of Africans who were forcefully transported to the New World, and he completely 
ignores Islam. His rigid view of the “triple melting pot” quickly broke down after the 1960’s 
when many other religious, racial and cultural identities began to fragment American society. 
Herberg’s analysis is not perfect, but he does recognize the importance of the immigrant 
experience in the development of American religious history in the 20th century. The deep need 
to feel that one has an identifiable location in the larger society led to a near-total assimilation of, 
at first the Protestants, and later the Jews and Catholics. Even though they preserved their 
religious heritages, that preservation was ultimately another manifestation of the deeper common 
cultural values that united the many into one nation. 
 Bellah states in the beginning of his essay that Herberg was wrong not to identify an 
“elaborate and well-institutionalized civil religion in America” that exists “alongside of” and 
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“clearly differentiated from the churches.”58 This “civil religion” in fact “requires the same care 
in understanding that any other religion does.”59 Its high priest is the President, its rituals are 
events like Presidential inaugurations and civic holidays, and its texts include Presidential 
inauguration speeches in a preeminent way. Its creed is one of “the rights of man” that are more 
basic than any political structure and provide a “point of revolutionary leverage from which any 
state structure may be radically altered.”60 Its mission is to “carry out God’s will on earth” which 
frequently means spreading American values around the globe.61  
 However, as others have pointed out, Bellah’s essay is constructed upon a “systematic 
ambiguity” around how he sees this phenomenon playing out in society.62 Elsewhere he seems to 
endorse a cultural model of “civil religion” when he refers to it as a “religious dimension” and, in 
a footnote, endorses the Durkheimian notion that “every group has a religious dimension” and 
perhaps that is why this civil religion has escaped notice.63 He further states that American civil 
religion has occurred only “semiconsciously” in society.64 So is the American civil religion a 
differentiated, well-institutionalized aspect of American society that should be studied like any 
other religion, or is it a diffuse, religious-like phenomenon that has developed underneath 
American culture? 
   Bellah seems to agree with Herberg that there is a definite religious dimension that has 
become integrated into American politics while not also supplanting other explicit manifestations 
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of religious belief. For example, when examining Kennedy’s inaugural address, Bellah notes that 
Kennedy (a Catholic) never mentions Christ or the Catholic Church because the tradition of 
American separation of church and state has always segregated the religious sphere, “which is 
considered essentially private,” from the political one.65 The political sphere maintains a 
“religious orientation that the great majority of Americans share,” but it is not identical with any 
church.66 Thus, Kennedy and other presidents have drawn upon Christian symbols, beliefs and 
language, but at the same time this common civil religion has always been other and more 
inclusive than just Christianity. This is very similar to Herberg’s observation that while the 
immigrants were expected to assimilate to American society in their behavior, dress, language 
and other cultural accoutrements, they were never expected to change their religious beliefs. 
Herberg identifies this phenomenon with the great American value of religious liberty that has 
become ensconced in American culture. Bellah likewise points out that the political separation of 
church and state has led to a privatization of religion. Both authors are correct that religion is 
viewed in American society as one of the few areas of private life that should not be controlled 
by the larger American culture or government.  
 What seems clear in Bellah’s analysis is that until the Civil War, whatever “civil 
religion” existed was more in line with Herberg’s “common religion” of the culture than it was a 
differentiated religion in itself. In 1789 Washington declared November 26 as the first 
Thanksgiving Day of “public thanksgiving and prayer,” in line with the pattern of later 
presidents who would consistently call upon God but not upon Christ.67 This God from which the 
presidents seek protection is a “Unitarian” God who is “much more related to order, law, and 
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right than to salvation and love” and who is “actively interested and involved in history, with a 
special concern for America.”68 Presidents such as Jefferson will not hesitate to use symbols 
from the Christian Bible such as the Exodus narrative when comparing America to the Promised 
Land to which God led his chosen people from their oppressors in Europe.69 The function of this 
common religion was not to advance Christianity or any sectarian church, but instead to serve as 
a “vehicle of national religious self-understanding.”70 It shared much with Christianity, but its 
purpose was to unify a diverse people one nation. Thus, one could be both a good Christian or 
Jew and a good American because the differences of religious denomination did not override the 
common orientation of the national civil religion.   
When Bellah states that the civil religion is a “collection of beliefs, symbols, and rituals 
with respect to sacred things and institutionalized in a collectivity,” he is drawing upon 
Durkheim to show that religion is institutionalized in the national culture, especially as this 
nationalism centers on the President.71 There is not a national church that substitutes for 
Christianity, Judaism or any of the other private religious denominations. This centering of the 
civil religion upon the President is only reinforced during the Civil War when a new theme of 
“death, sacrifice, and rebirth” enters the Presidential rhetoric.72 Especially in the Gettysburg 
Address—which he describes as part of the “Lincolnian ‘New Testament’ among the civil 
scriptures”—birth, sacrifice and rebirth are recurrent symbols that echo the Christian scriptures 
without explicitly invoking the Christian church.73 As already seen, Christian themes became co-
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opted by the civil religion but it did not replace private denominational commitments. The 
churches were in charge of “personal piety and voluntary social action” while the civil religion 
advanced a collective self-understanding that served to unify the nation.74 
 Bellah identifies the theme of sacrifice as “indelibly written into the civil religion” after 
the assassination of Lincoln who, like the war dead, was martyred for the nation.75 This 
symbolism of sacrifice became ritualized physically in national cemeteries such as the 
Gettysburg National Cemetery and the Arlington National Cemetery. The Arlington National 
Cemetery has received the dead of every succeeding war, and it is the site of the Tomb of the 
Unknown Soldier and the site of the tomb and eternal flame of former President John F. 
Kennedy.76 These sacred places are “national churches” that instantiate the theme of sacrifice 
that became so prominent in the national civil religion during the Civil War. Similarly, a ritual 
calendar for this civil religion is observed and promoted by the public school system. Memorial 
Day, Thanksgiving day, the Fourth of July, Veterans Day and the birthdays of Washington and 
Lincoln all serve to integrate the family and the community into the “national cult.”77 These days 
are the Sabbath days for the national civil religion.  
Bellah saw the civil religion as alive and well in the American nation. It functions as the 
“genuine apprehension of universal and transcendent religious reality as seen in or…as revealed 
through the experience of the American people.”78 This common experience has produced a 
genuinely American version of religion that is “activist, moralistic and social rather than 
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contemplative, theological, or innerly spiritual.”79 Unlike in France, the American civil religion 
has never been “anticlerical or militantly secular” and instead borrowed a great deal from the 
majority religion.80 The average American “saw no conflict between the two” and the civil 
religion was able to build up—along with the denominational churches—“powerful symbols of 
national solidarity and to mobilize deep levels of personal motivation for the attainment of 
national goals.”81 For example, the Christian symbols of Exodus and the New Israel have been 
both explicitly and implicitly linked to the idea of “manifest destiny” as America conquered the 
west and later engaged in imperialistic adventures overseas.82 The rhetoric of America as the 
“New Jerusalem” and the “last hope on earth” has been used to justify the Vietnam War.83 This 
fusion of “God, country and flag” that is part of the civil religion has also deeply influenced the 
nationalist orientation of the American religious denominations as they have acculturated to the 
larger national culture.84 The public civil religion and the private denominational religions have 
influenced each other and developed alongside each other throughout the history of the nation.  
 The civil religion exists in the national political rhetoric, in the calendar of holidays and 
in the national culture that emphasizes God, freedom, democracy and sacrifice as touchstones of 
a unified nation. This civil religion has been very useful at rallying the nation in times of crisis, 
particularly during the Revolutionary and Civil wars. But as Bellah points out, the idea of God is 
by no means static and he asks the very live question (especially after Kennedy’s election as the 
first Catholic president): could there be an agnostic president?85 Such an occurrence would 
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necessitate a profound change in the civil religion. Far from being a unified religious cult that 
can be differentiated from other religions, the American civil religion is best described as a 
cultural phenomenon that intersects with a variety of personal religious commitments of the 
American people. The civil religion is the “point of articulation between the profoundest 
commitments of the Western religious and philosophical tradition and the common beliefs of 
ordinary Americans.”86 It is the soil upon which other religious traditions have been transplanted. 
But it is also tightly entwined with the Protestant religions that were transported from Europe by 
the Puritans and other colonists. While not being identical with Protestantism, the civil religion 
clearly borrows from Christian symbolism in its fusion of the two. 
 Catherine Albanese more fully draws out the character of what she calls “public 
Protestantism” and its influence on American religious history. Public Protestantism originated 
in the Calvinist Christianity of the early Puritan settlers—nearly 90% of the congregations in the 
colonies in 1660 could be described as broadly Calvinist in inclination.87 Many factors 
contributed to the pervasive influence of Calvinism among the colonies, especially the 
educational earnestness of Puritan Christians who founded Harvard College in 1636 and operated 
the first printing press in the colonies.88 They also founded elementary schools and influenced 
the production of school textbooks and curricula into the twentieth century as teaching materials 
that communicated not only math and literacy but also religious concepts. These texts would 
become an impetus for the Catholic Church’s decision to found their own schools in America in 
the 19th and 20th centuries.89 Furthermore, Anglicanism in the southern colonies and Puritanism 
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in New England enjoyed a privileged status as the established religion until the late 19th century. 
Many of those who governed theses colonies were required to be members of the established 
religion.90 In all of these ways, a religious stamp was imprinted on the political and civic life of 
the earliest Americans because Church and state were far from separate at the local levels. 
This public Protestantism supplied many of the values and beliefs that became associated 
later with the phenomenon of civil religion. Religious liberty and democratic equality were all 
valued to different extents by the religious groups that fled Europe under persecution and sought 
refuge in the New World. Of course, these values would later become enshrined in the founding 
political documents of the new nation under the influence both of Protestantism and the 
European Enlightenment.91 The subsequent separation of church and state would influence the 
organization of American Protestantism in such a way that it fueled denominationalism (the 
union of distinct communities within the larger Christian church) and voluntaryism (the 
voluntary nature of all church membership).92 As Herberg argued, denominationalism and 
voluntaryism influenced how ethnic immigrant groups identified themselves within the larger 
society. Their voluntary religious affiliation became both a marker of identification for the 
immigrant group and a symbol of their status as properly assimilated Americans within the 
“triple melting pot” of Protestant, Catholic and Jew. 
Albanese goes into depth to explain the common characteristics of American culture and 
American public Protestantism: moralism, activism, individualism, emotionalism, simplicity and 
pragmatism. This list, almost identical to Herberg’s description of the “American Way of Life,” 
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came to characterize not only Protestantism but American culture in general. Albanese correctly 
points out the two spheres of influence interpenetrated and that it is probably impossible to 
discover which came first.93 Protestantism strongly influenced American culture, and American 
culture strongly influenced Protestantism.  
Albanese shows in detail how public Protestantism was a binding cultural force for the 
early nation. However, as shown in Herberg, immigration began to change the makeup of the 
American people and less and less people identified with the Puritan heritage. Something else 
was needed to unify a diverse people and Albanese identifies this as “civil religion,” and which 
she describes as a form of “religious nationalism.”94 Specifically, civil religion generally refers 
to a “religious system that has existed alongside the churches, with a theology (creed), an ethic 
(code), and a set of rituals and other identifiable symbols (cultus) related to the political state.”95 
This definition is very similar to Bellah’s definition of civil religion as a “public religious 
dimension” that is expressed in a “set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals.”96 The key here is that the 
civil religion is oriented toward the political state.  
However, according to Albanese, the experience of the Revolutionary War cemented a 
civil religion that was fully established by the time of George Washington’s inauguration.97 
Certainly many of the theological themes reviewed above influenced the rhetoric during the 
Revolutionary War—for example, the Americans were the New Israel and the British were the 
Egyptian oppressors at the time of the Exodus.98 There was a definite scriptural and millennial 
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aspect to the rhetoric that was only heightened when the Continental Congress ordered days of 
fasts and thanksgiving that were modeled on older Puritan days of prayer.99 Similarly, the 
Enlightenment, particularly through the influence of the Freemasonry movement, influenced this 
burgeoning civil religion. Rather than a Christian conception of a Trinitarian God, the 
Freemasonry movement believed in a Deist God who worked through the natural world.100 This 
God ruled over all human authority and could be appealed to as a higher divine law. This rhetoric 
of a higher divine law and a ruling Providence was part of the revolutionary rhetoric of the 
founding Fathers and, as shown by Bellah, is later used consistently in Presidential inauguration 
speeches.  
This civil religion had many of the characteristics of theistic religion. The practice of 
erecting and gathering around Liberty Trees provided a center for community orientation around 
the values of the revolution.101 The burgeoning religion even had its own divine figure, George 
Washington, who was described both as a Moses freeing his people from slavery and as the 
Roman general Cincinnatus who fought for his country and then returned to his farm.102 As 
Albanese points out, this double identification of Washington with both Jewish and Roman 
themes revealed the pluralism of American civil religion.103 While heavily influenced by 
Protestantism, by the time of the Revolutionary War and the ratification of the Constitution the 
American civil religion was oriented less around Protestantism. It was oriented much more 
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around the political bond that the nation had forged through a common set of shared historical 
experiences that included the inauguration of a President and the ratification of the Constitution.  
Albanese traces much of the history of American civil religion in the 19th century in a 
way similar to Bellah. As Freemasonry was discredited, Protestant religious rhetoric came once 
again to the fore. Particularly during the Civil War, millennial themes influenced how Americans 
on both sides of the conflict viewed the war—as a “final battle between good and evil.”104 
Similarly, religious rhetoric influenced how Americans interpreted the assassination of Abraham 
Lincoln, who was shot on Good Friday and whom many believed was another Jesus who 
sacrificed himself for the good of the people.105 Sacrifice became a part of the civil religion. 
Albanese identifies the 1950’s as a time of erosion of the civil religion as a unifying 
force. Unlike Herberg, who sees the “American Way of Life” in the 1950’s as a strong, unifying 
cultural force, Albanese recognizes that growing diversity began to weaken the traditional 
cultural bonds. For example, attendance and enthusiasm at Memorial Day celebrations—a 
holiday originally instituted after the Civil War to unite Americans around the value of sacrifice 
for one’s nation—began to wane dramatically and reached a nadir in the 1960’s.106 Many 
became less sure of the significance of sacrifice in foreign and morally ambiguous wars such as 
the Vietnam War (1954-1973).107 Albanese insightfully states that as the “past became older and 
the revolutionary events more distant,” Americans had trouble relating to such cultural 
foundations.108 The civil religion has always both looked to the past for meaning but also 
                                                 
104 Ibid., 451.  
105 Ibid.  
106 Ibid., 456.  
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid., 460. 
 
 
 
30 
 
encouraged values that tended to reject the past for the future.109 Protestant themes of being 
chosen by God for a mission and of millennialism were future-oriented. And what Albanese does 
not state is that the 1960’s were also a time of great cultural upheaval as racial minorities, 
women and other oppressed groups began to question the status quo. As Albanese states, the 
civil religion “was the religion of, at best, many of the people some of the time.”110 The unity of 
the past had served to cover over a great deal of diversity and disagreement. But the civil religion 
could not bear the weight of such multiplicity.   
Albanese identifies civil religion as a differentiated, positive religion in a much stronger 
sense than does Bellah who equivocates about precisely how to characterize civil religion. On 
the one hand, he desires to present civil religion as a differentiated religious system with its own 
creed, code and cult. However, Bellah really identifies common cultural values that have served 
to orient American society. Albanese, on the other hand, shows that civil religion was identical to 
Protestantism early on and then it quickly became oriented around the events of the 
Revolutionary War and the founding of the new nation. Holidays, constitutional parades, liberty 
trees, George Washington and Protestant religious symbols all contributed to a burgeoning 
national identity that unified the people around a common political center. Though it is a loose 
religious system, there are identifiable patterns of action and rituals that make up this civil 
religion. 
Albanese goes further and also distinguishes between civil religion and “cultural 
religion.” In fact, she states that the “one religion” of America is expressed in three forms: public 
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Protestantism, civil religion and general cultural religion.111 To further complicate matters, she 
states that civil religion and cultural religion are very similar in that they both are the “(mostly) 
ordinary religion of many Americans some of the time.”112 Civil religion is but “one expression” 
of the larger presence of cultural religion.113 In other words, civil religion and cultural religion 
both serve to unite American society through a commonly shared set of beliefs, code of 
behaviors and rituals. Yet cultural religion is a larger set that includes, but cannot be reduced to, 
civil religion.   
Much of cultural religion is below the level of conscious awareness and the boundaries 
between “cultural religion” and “civil religion” are porous. Her brief survey provides many 
examples of how Americans generally “order their lives and search for meaning within the 
everyday world” in ways distinct from the civil religion already discussed. For example, the 
American ritual calendar includes many days that are also part of the civil religion of the country 
such as Memorial Day and the Fourth of July. But there are other days as well—Halloween, New 
Year’s, Christmas—that are often celebrated by Christians and non-Christians alike. These days 
have a larger cultural meaning such as general good will among families and friends that 
transcends their connection to any particular denomination.114 Many of the common stories in the 
media also present Puritan and Revolutionary themes of millennial expectation that have been 
present sine the nation’s founding.115 Even sporting events resemble religious rituals and can 
lead to transcendent experiences of community.116 It can be difficult to distinguish between 
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merely “cultural religion” and “civil religion,” though the two kinds of ordinary religion are 
distinct. 
Albanese’s insight is that civil religion, though explicitly Christian and mostly identical 
to Puritanism at the founding of the colonies, gradually morphed into different manifestations. 
By the inauguration of George Washington, Enlightenment themes began to replace specifically 
Christian ideas. During the Civil War, the theme of sacrifice and new rituals developed in order 
to organize the community around remembrance of the dead. But gradually even the 
Enlightenment themes faded and by the 1950’s Herberg can identify an “American Way of Life” 
that is specifically American but religiously general. Most Americans expressed their 
commitment to the nation and to the values of democracy and equality through their own private 
denominational affiliations as Protestant, Catholic or Jew. Bellah recognized this phenomenon, 
called it a “civil religion,” and even argued for the resurgence of civil religion in the time of the 
Vietnam War to address emerging questions about foreign policy.117 Albanese sees this 
secularization of civil religion as continuing in the form of a “cultural religion” that shares 
elements of creed, cult and code but lacks the explicit references to God and to Christianity that 
heretofore had characterized civil religion in America. It is here that one can see how the 
separate spheres of the sacred and the profane identified by Durkheim have almost become 
identical in the ordinary experiences of most Americans. 
A type of civil religion has existed and continues to exist in America. But these authors 
show that its manifestations have varied substantially over time. While the phenomenon of a 
unifying cultural force has remained constant, the substance of that bond has not. The challenge 
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for the nation now is to define a new civil religion that is not only manifested in the tri-partite 
religious denominationalism that Herberg identified, but that can also include Muslims, other 
minority religious groups and even atheists. It remains an open question if the civil religion must 
center on a conception of a transcendent deity, a theological theme still expressed today in 
political rhetoric but clearly abandoned in the cultural religion of everyday life. Finally, there are 
limits to civil religion, for as Albanese identifies, civil religion has always only been a unifying 
cultural force for “many of the people some of the time.” The existence of pluralism will always 
put pressure upon the one religion of America and force it to continue to adapt to external 
pressures.  
The challenge for American Catholics is to negotiate the tension between the “ordinary” 
civil religion and the “extraordinary” Catholic religion. Much of the time, these two religions 
coexist peacefully and even productively. But particularly in times of national crisis such as war, 
a fierce nationalism can place the American Catholic at odds with a culture that does not uphold 
the same values as the Catholic Church. At the same time, a respect for religious pluralism 
necessitates that private citizens do not impose their personal religious beliefs upon the entire 
society. The American Catholic community, then, must decide how to be both faithfully Catholic 
and faithfully American. It is in light of this tension that we now turn to H. Richard Niebuhr’s 
Christ and Culture and to his typology of the ways that these two religions may interact.  
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Chapter 2: America, a “Nation with the Soul of a Church” 
 In an answer to the question, “What is America?” G.K. Chesterton replied that it is a 
“nation with the soul of a church.”118 Chesterton was referring to the fact that the nation had a 
definite creed. However, Sidney Mead pointed out decades later that all nations have a unifying 
creed, what is unique to America is the character of the creed as a “cosmopolitan, inclusive, 
universal theology.” 119  This creed both bonds together disparate religious sects and, through the 
power of a non-sectarian civil government, prevents any one particular religious group from 
dominating the others.  
 Using Benjamin Franklin and other founders of the nation as examples, Mead points out 
that their understanding of this American “creed” was not syncretistic but, rather, synergistic. 
They did not believe that the common American theology was a combination of all the 
individual theologies of the individual churches, but rather it was the product of the separate 
churches working in combination toward a common goal.120 Thus, he quotes Franklin as 
proclaiming that the “essentials of every religion” were to be found in all of them, while any 
particular sect contributed additional articles of belief.121 Franklin contributed a bit of money to 
every church in the country as a way to symbolize his belonging to all of them.122 This belief, 
echoed as well by Jefferson when he said that all religions “are good enough,” is part of the 
inclusive, universal American creed.123 
 What precisely defines this implicit American theology is debatable. Mead quotes 
Franklin and, a century later, Josiah Strong in order to show that concepts such as the existence 
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of God, the immortality of humans and humanity’s accountability to God are particular beliefs 
that run through much of American history.124 As Mead points, one may debate the particulars, 
but to do so is to admit the truth of his claim that a general sentiment is present in American 
society. Mead echoes the thesis of Will Herberg, that to be American is to be part of a particular 
religious community, but that it does not matter precisely to which sect one belongs because all 
of the churches share the most generalized and important theological beliefs.  
Mead dismisses the risk of idolatry inherent in such a merging of the national identity 
with theological principles. He insists that the national creed includes the belief that God is 
above any human institution and that this belief safeguards the entire social arrangement from 
being idolatrous.125 This implicit belief that the rights of Americans are natural and God-given is 
echoed in the Declaration of Independence, the writings of James Madison and the speeches of 
Abraham Lincoln who famously stated in his second inaugural address that the “Almighty has 
His own purposes…the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether.”126 Unlike 
Herberg, Mead believes that the implicit American creed, at its best, is essentially prophetic and 
not merely reflective of the American Way of Life.127 Such a creed has been present in the nation 
since the beginning and has always placed American society underneath the judgments of a 
higher deity.  
 He concludes that the struggle between Christianity and American culture is not really 
between the Church and the State, but rather has always been between the competing religious 
groups themselves.128 More specifically, the conflict is between particular religious sects and the 
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universal American theology that transcends and includes them. As particular religious sects 
sought to impose their particular will on the country, it forced the neutral civil government to 
adjudicate these conflicts when they threatened to disrupt the civil order.129 Thus, religious 
freedom led to religious pluralism which entailed denominationalism and sectarianism. Unlike 
the early Puritans who believed they were the “New Israel of God’s elect,” America’s 
experiment in religious freedom created a culture of religious voluntarysm in which every church 
claimed to be the most important among others and which its members were free to join or leave 
at will.130 But because the ultimate theological truths are universal and transcend any particular 
religious manifestation, then no denomination can claim or function as the church of the entire 
nation. The church of the entire nation is really the implicit creed that encompasses all particular 
churches.131 That is what Mead means when he repeats Chesterton’s phrase that America is “a 
nation with the soul of a church.”  
 As far back as the Puritans, Protestantism viewed the American experiment as the “ark of 
God’s redemptive work in the world.”132 The nation became the primary source of personal and 
group identity for people divided by religious sectarianism. Herberg labeled this unifying 
principle “the American Way of Life,” but it is clear that such a force predated the 20th century. 
This cultural understanding was prevalent in many histories that emphasized Protestant 
America’s unique relationship to God and its divine role in history.133 Americans tended to view 
themselves as forming a “community of righteousness” destined to fulfill God’s historic 
purposes.134 The American identity was neither anti-religious nor secular, but instead “borrowed 
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selectively” from the religious traditions in such a way that the “average American saw no 
conflict between the two.”135 As Mead points out, the most common symbol in Christian 
churches of his day was the United States flag.136 To be a good Christian was to be a good 
American.  
 This emphasis on a national unity that transcends particular denominational differences 
lays behind the Catholic ecumenical outreach that accelerated after Vatican II. Boston’s Richard 
Cardinal Cushing described such an experience of unity amidst diversity: 
[I] came to recognize that the differences between Catholics and Protestants in America 
were not so much religious as they were social and cultural…I discovered that what the 
ecumenists today call ‘nontheological factors’ were isolating us and setting Catholic 
against Protestant…more than our doctrines.137 
 
Cardinal Cushing’s statement is remarkable because it dismisses doctrinal concerns that even a 
few years before were the source of great social division. His statement is reflective, however, of 
Mead’s point that a universal, inclusive understanding of what it means to be American runs 
throughout the history of the nation. This unifying force transcends any single sectarian 
expression and instead unites all of the various churches under one theological umbrella. The 
ultimate truths expressed in varying ways by the many different sects are the truly important 
doctrines recognized by all Americans.  
 Mead only shows Christianity and American culture in harmonious and productive 
relationship. And for much of American history, at least for the majority of Protestants, this has 
been the case. But such a rosy picture is far from the truth. Throughout American history, 
minority and break-away Protestant sects were consistently persecuted and even exiled by the 
larger Christian community. Whether they were the Quakers or the Mormons, Mead’s picture of 
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Americans of all sects united under one cultural roof is not representative of all Americans 
throughout history. Furthermore, Mead’s analysis neglects the treatment of Jews, Catholics and 
Native Americans since the founding of the nation. As Herberg points out, Catholic immigrant 
communities were as much a way to support each other in a hostile culture as they were a way to 
develop an identity as Americans who belonged to a particular religious community. And since 
Mead wrote, the prevalence of Muslims and atheists in American society has only grown. It is 
not at all clear today that to be a good Muslim or a good atheist is to be a good American.   
 These examples of conflicts between religious sects and between religious sects and the 
larger society (at times even the government itself) highlight the fact that Mead’s analysis is a bit 
too optimistic. At this point, it is helpful to examine other possible relationships, particularly as 
we focus upon the relationship of the Catholic Church in America to the larger American culture. 
Unlike the Protestant culture that has permeated American society since the founding of the 
colonies, Catholics—to quote Garry Wills—have always been distinctly aware that they “grew 
up different.”138 Catholics tended to live in subcultures that existed within, and frequently in 
opposition to, the dominant Protestant culture. It was not until Vatican II when the Catholic 
Church as an institution began to step outside of its protective ghetto into the 20th century. With 
that transition arose new questions about how the Church should relate to its surrounding culture.  
 H. Richard Niebuhr’s book Christ and Culture offers five helpful models for 
understanding this interaction. Three of these models—Christ against culture, Christ of culture, 
and Christ above culture—are important to examine but are ultimately not helpful models for 
understanding the Catholic Church’s relationship to American culture today. The first two 
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models are too extreme and distort the gospel. The third model, Christ above culture, presumes 
that both the Church and the wider culture are oriented toward the same divine ends and can be 
synthesized into a coherent structure. In today’s secular world, this arrangement is no longer the 
case and we must search for new models. “Christ and culture in paradox” is one possible model 
for today’s context, but ultimately fails because of its overly negative view of humanity. The 
final model, “Christ the Transformer of Culture,” best describes the church-world relationship 
that is beginning to take shape at Vatican II, particularly in its final document Gaudium et Spes. 
This model, when properly modified by a Catholic understanding, is not a utopian fantasy. 
Instead, it is a dialogue between two parties that have much to learn from each other. In this way, 
the model is similar to the interpersonal dynamics between two people who desire to understand 
each other within a mutually enriching relationship. 
 As Niebuhr himself notes, typologies necessarily use leaky categories. They attempt to 
make distinctions between ideas that do not always neatly separate: “the type is always 
something of a construct.”139 Even though he uses historical figures in order to demonstrate his 
ideal types, no one person or group can ever conform completely to a type. The types are ideal 
models in which to fit the recurrence of common historical patterns. Niebuhr desires to point to 
the “continuity and significance of the great motifs that appear and reappear” in the long history 
of Christians puzzling out how to interact with the wider culture while still being true to their 
faith. 
 The “Christ against culture” model is one extreme on a spectrum that is bounded at the 
other end by the “Christ of culture” model. In fact, their positions as the poles of a spectrum 
already suggest that they are probably inadequate models for a relationship between faith and 
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culture that respects both the ad intra and ad extra natures of the Church. The Christian church is 
called both to seek the salvation of the souls within her walls, but also to reach out to all those 
who live outside. Nonetheless, examining precisely why the “Christ against culture” model is 
inadequate can be a helpful step toward articulating a more fitting model.  
 The attempt of this model to “uncompromisingly” affirm “the sole of authority of Christ 
over the Christian” is admirable.140 But the extreme nature of its position is clear when it 
presumes that this fidelity to Christ must come at the cost of any claim of culture over the 
Christian. There are certainly strains of such a rejection in scripture, most notably in 1 John and 
its distinction between the Christian community and the world: “do not love the world or 
anything in the world…the world and its desire are passing away, but those who do the will of 
God live forever.”141 There is a definite separation in 1 John between those in the Christian 
community and those outside of it, with the author going so far as to refer to those who have left 
the community as antichrists.142 At the same time, Niebuhr acknowledges that any attempt to 
interpret historical documents in such binary terms will fall apart upon closer examination. The 
author of 1 John also declares, for example, that Jesus Christ is the “atoning sacrifice” both for 
our sins and for the sins of the world.143 The emphasis in the letter is certainly upon love for 
one’s fellow believers in the Christian community, but there are at least hints that those outside 
the community are still saved by Christ. Furthermore, it is likely that the author assumed the end 
of the world was imminent, and so he did not comment upon how a Christian should participate 
in the social institutions of the culture, own property or pay taxes.144 It is unclear precisely how 
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far the author would have gone in rejecting the surrounding culture if he believed the Parousia 
was delayed. 
 As already mentioned, Niebuhr’s goal is not to present a one-sided, biased picture of 
these authors. His goal, instead, is to show how certain motifs have recurred throughout history, 
beginning with scripture, moving into the early Christian community and even to contemporary 
times. One such motif is the assumption that the conflict of the believer is not with his own 
nature but with culture.145 Thus Niebuhr quotes Tertullian who states that Christ came “as one 
who aimed to enlighten men already civilized, and under illusions from their very culture, that 
they might come to the knowledge of the truth.”146 The fear behind the “Christ against culture” 
type is that the “Christian is in constant danger of compromising his loyalty to the Lord.”147 Even 
the most minimal involvement with the pagan religion can put the Christian in spiritual danger 
through participation in idolatry and polytheism. Yet even Tertullian does not believe the 
Christian can ever completely cut himself off from participation in the culture, for in his defense 
of the Christian community he points out to the Romans that “we sail with you, and fight with 
you…and in like manner we unite with you in your traffickings.”148 Even Paul, who warned 
against eating the meat sacrificed to idols, also said not to be disagreeable in the market or at a 
meal hosted by an unbeliever if the provenance of the meat is unknown.149 
 This is the fundamental problem with the model of exclusionary Christianity. It presumes 
that human beings can ever separate themselves from the larger culture. But as Niebuhr admits 
earlier in the chapter, “we cannot escape culture any more readily than we can escape nature.”150 
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The logical fallacy behind sectarian communities that withdraw from the surrounding culture is 
that they can never completely extricate themselves from their cultural setting. Indeed, to form 
one’s personal and communal identity around being against another is still to continue a 
relationship with the other. The culture of a sectarian community is still partially defined by what 
it is not. Its cultural values include the belief that it is good that the community is not the same as 
the larger culture. 
 The radical Christian always makes use of the parts of the culture which he claims to 
reject.151 He or she speaks and thinks with the aid of language. The Christian community, even 
after its withdrawal from the dominant culture, must function with its own cultural and social 
systems. These political, economic and philosophical systems must arise from somewhere, for 
scripture is not a sufficient source of all the conceptual resources required to found a society. 
Scripture itself is inflected with the philosophical and social concepts that it inherited from 
Judaic, Roman and Hellenistic cultural sources. Furthermore, the Christian also has a moral 
imperative to spread the gospel to others outside of his community and to act with love toward 
his neighbors who are both inside and outside of his community. But to interact with others 
requires a grounding in the meaning of language and the cultural ideas that enable 
communication to occur in the first place. The interpretation of scripture itself requires one to 
transplant the scripture from the culture of ancient Palestine into a new cultural context. As 
Niebuhr states, a Christian can “withdraw from its more obvious institutions and expressions,” 
but for the most part he or she can only select and modify those things that have been received 
through the mediation of the surrounding society.152 There is no true escape from culture. 
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 The primary answer given by any sectarian group to the Christ and culture question is to 
respond that the achievement of a Christian life is wholly distinct from the aims that humans 
seek in the world; politics, economics, science and even arts, while good, should not be the main 
foci of a Christian community.153 Thus, even though the monastic communities contributed a 
great deal to culture, their main intention was the spiritual perfection of their members apart from 
civilization and in obedience to Christ.154 The spirituality behind the “Christ against culture” 
model can vary greatly while sharing a general rejection of the “world.” Apocalyptic Christians 
reject the culture because they believe the coming divine order is imminent; mystics announce 
the reality of the eternal order that is hidden behind the transient temporal order.155 Even 
differences between Catholic and Protestant creeds are ultimately unimportant to this model 
because both religious traditions can share in the rejection of the “world” and a focus on God’s 
coming kingdom. The primary theological problem with such a stance toward culture is that it 
emphasizes one truth (the sovereignty of God) at the expense of another truth (Christians are also 
called to spread the gospel within the temporal sphere).  
 These ethical concerns, however, are built upon other theological presuppositions that are 
also fallacious. At the theological heart of this model is a Trinitarian problem: how to understand 
the relationship of Jesus to God the creator of the universe and to the Spirit immanent in that 
creation.156 The temptation of people within this model is toward a Manichean ontological 
dualism that only sees God and the Spirit present within the Christian and his community, and 
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therefore all of the material realm outside of the community of faith is governed by the antichrist 
(to use the theological language of 1 John).157  
This ontological bifurcation is the root of several other theological problems about issues 
of reason and revelation, sin and human nature, and law and grace. Rather than seeing God 
present through the Spirit in each of these realities (a both/and mentality), the exclusionary 
Christian will tend to pit them against each other (an either/or mentality). Created reason is 
corrupt because it is present in culture, while revelation is incorrupt because it comes directly 
from God.158 Thus, the author of 1 John can declare that the Christians have knowledge because 
they have been “anointed by the Holy One.”159  
Similarly, there is a tendency for exclusionary Christians to so associate sin with the 
culture that they neglect the sin present within themselves and within their Christian society. 
Even the author of 1 John admits that sin must still be conquered within the Christian 
community: “if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.”160 But if 
sin is more deeply rooted in human nature than the exclusionary Christian assumes, then his or 
her strategy of withdrawing from the world is not sufficient to effect Christ’s victory over the 
world.161 
Finally, and closely connected, is the relationship of law and grace. Niebuhr wisely points 
out that the follower of this model, by withdrawing form society, is seeking to set firm 
boundaries with the surrounding culture. As such, there is naturally an emphasis upon ethical 
conduct because of the importance of living in a way that contrasts with the non-Christian 
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society.162 Furthermore, forming a new society that is very different from the society in which 
the community originates necessitates the development of clear rules of conduct. Critics of this 
model often seize on this focus upon legalism rather than upon grace. It is an unfair critique, 
however, because such people as the author of 1 John, for example, clearly state that the grace of 
God is primary: “since God loved us so much, we also ought to love one another.”163 Similarly, 
Tertullian states even though the Christian looks no different from non-Christians in his daily 
activities, he in fact looks different because of his changed interior state: “he knows grace and 
hence reflects grace.”164 These writers and others do not neglect the grace of God as much as 
some exemplars of the other types whom we will examine later. 
 As Niebuhr states, there is much to appreciate about this theological position, even if it is 
pragmatically untenable and internally self-contradictory. The question that all of Niebuhr’s 
models attempt to answer is how a Christian must live in the interim period between the 
incarnation and the Parousia. A rejection of culture, even if only of the culture’s most significant 
institutions, is still a profound witness to the transcendent destiny and trans-political loyalty of 
the human race.165 A Christian who refuses to participate in military service or the worship of the 
Roman emperor is making a profound statement that his or her religious values require the 
Christian to live in tension with the society. Such an extreme stance also forces Christians to live 
their lives with greater integrity, and it helps to keep the Church from becoming merely an 
“instrument of the state…as one more group of power-hungry or security-seeking men.”166 Any 
adequate model of Christ and culture, then, must strike a balance between allowing for some 
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tension with society when necessary, while not completely rejecting the culture or subsuming its 
values to those of the culture.   
 This “Christ against culture” stance was the one exemplified during the “long nineteenth-
century” of the Catholic Church that extended from the French Revolution until Gaudium et Spes 
was promulgated at Vatican II.167 The Church as a societas perfecta (to use Bellarmine’s image) 
was the prevailing ecclesiology, incarnated in the structures of an alternate society.168 In 
America, Catholic immigrants tended to live together and form a “parallel network” of 
institutions, a “Catholic ministate” to use the phrase of Charles Morris.169 These “cradle to 
grave” institutions that included parishes, hospitals, businesses owned by Catholics, schools, the 
Knights of Columbus and even a Catholic press, allowed Catholics to immunize themselves from 
the corrupt culture of liberalism that was infecting the modern world and also to prepare 
themselves to undertake the spiritual battle necessary to restore the world to the kingship of 
Christ.170 It is not a coincidence that Piux XI instituted the Feast of Christ the King in 1925 in 
order to remind Catholics that their allegiance was not to any earthly power.  
 It is to the “Christ of culture” which we now turn and which can easily be described as 
the exact opposite of the previous model. Rather than focusing on God and the coming Kingdom, 
the focus is on humanity and the present time. To use Niebuhr’s metaphor, the previous “Christ 
against culture” model was a circle with one center, but in this model Christianity is an ellipse 
with two foci: the forgiveness of sins and the striving toward the perfect human society which is 
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the ultimate goal of such divine assistance .171 Jesus is the “great educator…philosopher or 
reformer” whose work is the “training of men in their present social existence.”172 Whether they 
are the Judaizers of Paul’s time, the Gnostics of the Hellenistic world or the liberal Protestants of 
the twentieth century, they all interpret Jesus primarily in cultural terms and minimize any 
conflict between Christ and culture.173  
 Rather than humanity versus culture, the focus is on humanity versus nature. The great 
accomplishments of humanity lie in its conquests over the external world. The ethical duty of 
every person is the victory of his reason over his own irrational nature. As Niebuhr states, 
humanity faces a “double problem” in the ethical realm, for it must “subdue its own nature” and 
“overcome the despair” which arises from understanding that the external, natural world is 
indifferent to humanity’s own transcendent desires.174 Such a paradigm fits in well with the 
Enlightenment emphasis upon human reason and autonomy.  
 The Church is not a separate, walled-off community, but rather an inclusive religious 
association in which all of humanity can eventually come together in a peaceful, cooperative 
society.175 The focus is on ethics, the interpersonal dynamics that govern the quality of human 
communities, and Jesus is the great teacher who directs all people toward wisdom, moral 
perfection and peace.176 Jesus is not so much the “Christ of the New Testament” but the 
“principle of mediation between finite and infinite” within the culture, the man who enters into 
the lives of all people and “adds an aura of infinite meaning to all temporal tasks.”177 The 
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vocation of the Christian is not to evangelize a culture that is resistant to the gospel, but to 
engage in the building up of the Kingdom of God through one’s activities in the cultural sphere. 
Being true to the example of Christ is to engage in one’s “civic work for the sake of the common 
good” and to remain faithful to one’s “social calling.”178 
 The most valuable aspects of culture to preserve are such achievements as the use of 
human reason, scientific advancement, social cooperation and democratic principles. 
Monarchies, religious wars, and political and religious persecution are dismissed as historical 
aberrations and cultural artifacts of a bygone era. Christian beliefs about original sin and 
crucifixion, resurrection and salvation are glossed over. Jesus achieved some things for humanity 
that could not be achieved through human labor alone, such as the forgiveness of sins and 
immortality.179 Nevertheless, the focus is never to transcend the temporal order, but rather to 
advance the kingdom of God on earth. 
These types of disciples try to reconcile the gospel with what is best in human culture in 
their own time. In the era of the early Church they sought to interpret the gospel in the light of 
Ptolemaic astronomy and Hellenistic philosophy; in the nineteenth century they sought to 
understand the gospel in terms of evolution and the principles of human reason.180 Similarly, 
they will excise the parts of the scripture that do not suit their purposes by focusing on Jesus’ 
teachings about the Kingdom of God but ignoring the apocalyptic ones. They tend to ignore 
important theological concepts such as the fall, incarnation, judgment and resurrection which 
would suggest “cracks in time,” discontinuity and interruption.181 In contrast to the “Christ 
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against culture” model, the focus is not on eschatology and the sovereignty of Christ as Lord of 
heaven and earth.182 
At the same time, one can see that this model is the basis for any kind of intentional 
engagement with culture. This model avoids the ontological dualism of the first model because, 
while God’s creation is still a source of conflict with humanity, this conflict can be overcome 
through the Christian improvement of human culture. Jesus is the Messiah of all human culture. 
Proponents of this model accept what is good even in non-Christian cultures. This openness to 
culture has attracted many followers over the centuries because the Christian evangelizers have 
inculturated the gospel into the languages, concepts and values of these other cultures. Niebuhr 
points to Paul as the great exemplar of this kind of inculturation: attracting people to the 
“harmony of the Christian message with the moral and religious philosophy of their best 
teachers, and by the agreement of Christian conduct with that of their exemplary heroes.”183 
These Christians recognize that there is a “stability in human wisdom” because they recognize 
that God is Lord of all cultures, that Jesus is the savior of all of humanity and that his Spirit is 
immanent in all cultures.184   
Unlike the exclusionary Christians, the proponents of the Christ of culture model do not 
think that reason and revelation, sin and human nature, and law and grace are in conflict. 
Revelation is merely the “religious name for that process which is essentially the growth of 
reason in history.”185 Sin is present in irrational passions and institutions, but human nature and 
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society is perfectible through proper moral and cultural formation.186 Grace is “ancillary” to the 
human enterprise that depends upon the correct use of reason.  
Yet, upon closer inspection, a strict conflation of Christ and culture leads to other 
theological problems. The conflation of reason and revelation fails to address the fact that the 
belief “Jesus is the Christ” cannot be reached through reason alone, and so revelation cannot be 
completely absorbed into reason.187 Just as the holy community of the “Christ against culture” 
model was a realm free from sin, so too now the human person led by purified reason is also free 
from sin.188 And the heavy focus on a self-reliant humanism gets dangerously close to 
Pelagianism; it is not clear how the human person needs grace. Finally, this model too raises 
Trinitarian questions. God is immanent in human reason and culture but no attention is given to 
God’s immanence in the natural world. How does the same God relate both to the power 
manifest in the natural world and to the human achievements that seek to conquer that same 
natural power? Relatedly, if Jesus is immanent in human culture, then what is the role of the 
Spirit? Niebuhr insightfully concludes, one must always “confess more” than merely that Jesus is 
the Christ of culture.189 The identification of Christ completely with culture is ultimately 
incoherent because it solves some theological problems while creating others. The Jesus present 
in the gospels is much more than the teacher of wisdom and ethical conduct. The variegated 
histories of cultures exemplify something other than the presence of the spirit of Christ in their 
eras of irrational violence and oppression.  
The “Christ of culture” model is the extreme version of a Christianity that is too 
accommodating to culture. This model is the paradigm behind a Protestantism that has 
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accommodated itself to the American Way of Life and to the general American theology that 
transcends any particular, sectarian expression. This American civil religion was able to 
incorporate even the Deist Founding Fathers because they too were disciples of a “Christ of 
culture” who shared the great values esteemed by the Democratic culture of the time: the 
freedom of the individual, social cooperation and universal peace.190 As the Catholic Church 
began to embrace these Democratic values as well at Vatican II, it had to think anew about how 
to engage a culture toward which it had long been hostile. This openness to culture and reading 
the “signs of the times” would be an analogous movement from a closed “Christ against culture” 
stance toward a more inclusive “Christ of culture” one. The dilemma, as always, is to engage the 
culture without being identical to the culture. The next three models that Niebuhr describes are 
all attempts to hold Christ and culture in the appropriate amount of tension.  
 One of those models that attempts this balance is the “Christ above culture” model, or 
what Niebuhr also calls the “synthesis of Christ and culture.”191 Culture is neither wholly evil nor 
wholly good, but rather a mix of holiness and sinfulness, divinity and humanity, reason and 
revelation. The synthesist wants to take seriously the gap between Christ and culture (in response 
to the accommodation to culture) and try to overcome the gap (in response to the withdrawal 
from culture).192 In order to achieve the proper balance, the disciple of this model must take 
seriously human culture and acknowledge that it is good as far as it goes. The key to this model 
is that human efforts can only take the Christian so far. God must do the rest by grace. 
Niebuhr’s prime example of this synthesis is Thomas Aquinas. In this system, culture is 
the preliminary training ground for eternal life with God, and the Church is the guardian of the 
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culture, but the final end of the human person is always the beatific vision.193 It is significant that 
rather than pit revelation against reason, Thomas baptizes Aristotelian philosophy to serve this 
higher end. Christianity and culture are not opposed, but rather Christianity builds upon culture 
and completes it. That is why Niebuhr calls this model “Christ above culture.” Christ is always 
separate from culture, but the path toward Christ is through culture. There is a “double 
happiness” for the human being: the “imperfect happiness” of the temporal sphere and the 
perfect happiness of eternal life with God.194 Culture is not against Christianity nor coincident 
with it. It is an incomplete good for the human person because it alone is not sufficient for 
humanity’s ultimate happiness. 
Culture has an important role in preserving and transmitting humanity’s ability to 
understand truth through the proper use of reason and to live an ethical life through the ordinary, 
civil virtues. The great social institutions such as the family, state and Church are mediators of 
God’s grace for human society through their role in this process of cultural and human 
development. God’s grace is always at work, but it builds upon the material conditions of the 
human person and of society.195 The “merely” moral life in society is neither irrelevant to 
Christian progress nor the human person’s ultimate goal.  
This principle that “grace perfects nature” is key to the synthetic model. The gospel 
always adds something more. As Aquinas states:  
There must be superadded to man by the gift of God certain principles, whereby he may 
be put on the way to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end 
by natural principles, yet not without divine aid.196 
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The human person can only acquire theological virtues through God’s added grace. Similarly, 
the natural law is discoverable by means of reason but the divine law transcends that is must be 
discovered through revelation.197 Human abilities must be supplemented by specific virtues from 
God and by knowledge of the revealed truth of divine law. The role of the Church in such a 
system is to provide grace through the sacraments and to direct human persons to their 
supernatural end with God.198 But the Church also helps to order temporal life through its 
guidance as the keeper of the divine law.199 In Aquinas’ synthesis, all of the social institutions—
church, state, universities—work both toward helping human beings to live together peacefully 
on earth while directing them toward their supernatural end with God. 
  This model is very attractive because it both preserves the autonomy of the natural world 
and acknowledges the goodness of reason and culture. All of creation, especially reason and 
culture, is good because they can direct human persons toward their temporal happiness. 
Creation is not evil but the foundation upon which God’s grace continues to build. In principle, 
there is no conflict between God and creation or between nature and human society. Such a 
model takes seriously the primordial truth that what God creates is good. Revelation builds upon 
created reason, grace completes created humanity and the divine law completes the natural law. 
This positive view of creation also contributes to a better understanding of the Trinity than we 
have yet seen in the other models. The Creator and the savior are one because the savior is one 
who saves humanity in creation rather than from creation.200  
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 Unfortunately, such a model is not viable in today’s world. As Niebuhr points out, there 
is a hierarchical character to his vision of the interaction between the Church and society.  In 
such a society, he states: 
 …a chain of command extends from the Divine Lawgiver and Ruler through…the 
church with its papal head, through the subordinate princes…till it reaches the final 
subjects, who have only to obey.201  
 
God orders the temporal world by means of cultural institutions, particularly the Church, which 
are oriented above themselves toward the divine. This model worked well in a feudal society 
built upon hierarchies of power. But Niebuhr is correct to observe that, although such nineteenth-
century Catholic leaders like Pope Leo XIII seemed to promote a synthetic model of Church and 
state interaction, they were in reality promoting something else.202 While the synthesis of Christ 
and culture was their goal, they wanted to synthesize Christ with the culture of the thirteenth 
century rather than their own contemporary culture. They merely repeated Aquinas’ theology 
without attempting to adapt it to a world marked by religious pluralism rather than a unified 
Christendom. The focus was on recreating the social and cultural world of the thirteenth century 
rather than upon the presence of Christ in the contemporary world. This reversion to the past, of 
course, was impossible and contributed to the “long nineteenth century” that was marked more 
by the “Christ against culture” paradigm rather than a synthetic one.  
 This tendency of the anti-Modernists to defend the particular culture of the thirteenth 
century rather than attempt a new synthesis reveals another problem with the paradigm: a lack of 
a proper understanding of history. Aquinas conceived of natural law as something knowable 
through the proper use of reason by any human person in any society and in any historical era. 
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Yet his hierarchical view of the natural order came out of a medieval worldview, and his 
conception of the ultimate end of the human person arose from within a society in which the 
existence of God was presumed. However, as soon as one acknowledges the historical and 
cultural particularity of all beliefs, then one also must acknowledge that culture is subject to 
continuous transformation. The gospel may not change, but humanity’s access to its truths in 
every age is necessarily provisional and fragmentary. And as soon as the gospel and the culture 
are no longer static, then the synthesis breaks down. In other words, Aquinas synthesized a 
particular configuration of his culture with the gospel. When the culture changed, the synthesis 
he created needed to change as well.  
 Finally, one can argue that Aquinas’ perspective on culture and human society is much 
too optimistic. He does take account of sin in his theology, otherwise there would be no need for 
grace. Human beings are fallen and cannot achieve the end for which they are created by 
themselves. But if sin really does infect humanity at an ontological level, then all of humanity’s 
actions, including its use of reason and production of culture, should be tainted as well. It is not 
clear why human culture and reason should be the unmitigated goods that they for him. Because 
they are infected by sin, they can just as often lead to unhappiness. In an effort to take the radical 
nature of sin more seriously, Niebuhr presents his final two models: “Christ and Culture in 
Paradox” and “Christ the Transformer of Culture.” 
  In order to examine further the “Christ and Culture in Paradox” model—what is often 
termed “Christian Realism”—it will be helpful to turn to Reinhold Niebuhr (H. Richard 
Niebuhr’s brother) on the Protestant side and to Johann Baptist Metz on the Catholic side.203 
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Niebuhr attacks the two main theses that modern theology and history has based itself upon: 1) 
the perfectibility of the human person and 2) the idea of progress.204 These assumptions, he 
asserts, have led the modern social and psychological sciences to many erroneous conclusions 
precisely because their methods are founded upon these faulty premises.205 For Niebuhr, these 
theories totalize human nature at the cost of distorting it. Thus, the human being’s freedom is a 
source both of great creativity and horrendous destruction. A person’s lustful desires, ambition 
and egocentricity cannot be controlled merely through the use of reason and proper social 
control.206 These assumptions also contribute to that second erroneous assumption, that human 
culture, properly directed, can control the historical destiny of humanity and lead it to a future 
utopia.207  
But, as Niebuhr shows, there is ample historical proof from Communism to laissez-faire 
capitalism that these assumptions are incorrect. Because they do not take into account the moral 
limitations of human nature, any totalizing ideology will inevitably lead to great misery. Niebuhr 
thinks these facts about human nature are self-evident and the basis of what he calls “Christian 
Realism.” 208 The Modern desire to control the human person through the use of rational, 
technocratic means is misguided at best and evil at worst. As a Christian theologian, he wants to 
use the resources of Christianity to recover a much more realistic and proper understanding of 
the human person as both corrupted by sin and redeemable by Christ. However, and this is 
important for his political theology, while individual human beings can often check their self-
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interested impulses, it is unrealistic to expect that humanity’s collective behavior can ever be 
brought “completely under the dominion of reason or conscience.”209 
 At the same time as Niebuhr, J.B. Metz was also presenting a Catholic version of 
“Christian Realism.” These theologians were using philosophical critiques prevalent at the time 
to critique the Modernist project. Neo-Marxists such as the Frankfurt School were becoming 
suspicious of the capacities of human reason and its technical mastery over nature. As one 
member of this School wrote: “there is no document of civilization which is not at the same time 
a document of barbarism.”210 Niebuhr and many others were beginning to recognize that the 
historical detritus left in the wake of so-called human progress was piling up. Certainly for Metz 
and Niebuhr, and for many in the second-half of the twentieth-century, the horrors of two world 
wars, the Holocaust and the subsequent rise of totalitarianism was prompting a stark re-
evaluation of the Modern political project.  
 Metz viewed praxis as constitutive of the Christian idea of God. His suspicion of 
ideologies made him wary of the “usual linear relationship” between theory and praxis in which 
praxis means “carrying out, applying, or concretizing a theory that has already been 
formulated.”211 This uncritical appropriation of theory can blind one to the ideological interests 
that are served by it—usually the interests of the victors of history. That blindness is the 
traditional problem with theories of history that have ignored the human history of suffering. 
Instead, Metz places praxis alongside theory when he recognizes that Christian concepts such as 
“metanoia, conversion, and exodus…belong to the fundamental way theology operates.”212 
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Discipleship expresses a knowledge that is “essentially practical.”213 Christianity is a dialectic 
(not a linear progression) of theory and praxis, subject and object: “only by following him 
[Jesus] do Christians know the one they have gotten involved with and the one who saves 
them.”214 Thus the memory of God’s actions in human history and the narratives that both 
describe those actions and call forth a practical response in discipleship constitute theology as a 
praxis-oriented discipline. In other words, Christian theologies that deny the responsibility of 
subjects as meaningful actors in history also deny their own identities as Christian theologies.  
Metz focusses on suffering in history as a way to develop a spirituality for Christians in 
today’s world. He focusses specifically on Israel’s experience because of its history of cultural 
and political insignificance.215 This poverty of Israel means that it could not separate itself from 
its own suffering and was forced to cry out to God for help. And it is this poverty of spirit that is 
the model for all Christians. But this constant questioning of God always looks to the eschaton, 
toward the time when God will “prove Godself to us as love.”216 The cry of Israel to God 
throughout the Psalms, Lamentations, Job and the prophets—“How long yet?”—must not be 
silenced in Modernity’s quest to soothe itself, to anesthetize itself from the pain of suffering and 
its accompanying guilt. The resurrection and second coming of Jesus is God’s answer to all 
innocent suffering and the basis of hope for the future. As the “firstborn of all creation,” Jesus is 
both the fulfillment of God’s promises to Israel and a sign of its future fulfillment (Col. 1:15). 
Metz and Niebuhr both exemplify important theological ideas behind the “Christ and 
Culture in Paradox” model. If the models presented thus far were on a continuum with the 
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“Christ against culture” model and the “Christ of culture” model at either end, then the “Christ 
above Culture” model would be in the middle because it tries to balance the two extremes. The 
“Christ and Culture in Paradox” model would lie somewhere between the “Christ against 
culture” model and the “Christ above culture” model since it shares in features of both 
paradigms. Like the synthesist model, the paradox model tries to hold culture and faith together, 
but believes that the synthesist model is far too naive about human sinfulness and cultural 
progress.  
The main conflict in the paradox model is not between Christ and culture, but rather 
between “the righteousness of God and the righteousness of self.”217 For the synthesist, human 
reason is fallible but not by nature misdirected. Culture can be improved through better 
reasoning and the Christian institutions are, at their core, beyond corruption. For the Christian 
Realist, however, when compared to the great holiness of God all human works are “sordid and 
depraved” and “pitifully inadequate.”218  The focus for this model is upon the great “act of 
reconciliation and forgiveness” of the cross and the unmerited grace that God gives to all 
people.219 The synthesis model was about drawing culture up toward God. The paradox model is 
about consistently holding God and creation in a properly balanced tension. The Christian Realist 
neither emphasizes one over the other: grace and nature, sin and redemption, the sinner who is 
simul justus et peccator (to use Luther’s phrase).  
Godlessness is the essence of sin in this model. It is the “will to live without God, to 
ignore Him…to be independent and secure in one’s self, to be godlike in oneself.”220 One can see 
here the anti-Modern ideology critique behind Niebuhr and Metz’s theologies. Where the 
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Modern synthesists wanted to emphasize the role of human reason and freedom, the Christian 
Realist sees a tendency toward Godless self-reliance:  
As Christians we want to be the forgivers of sins, the lovers of men, new incarnations of 
Christ, saviors rather than saved…we try to give ourselves the assurance that we are on 
His side facing the rest of the world….221 
 
But this belief that we can save ourselves through culture, even though also acknowledging the 
aid of grace in this process, is ultimately wishful thinking. Reason in human affairs is never 
separable from the human sinfulness that infects it with “egoistic, godless, perversion.”222  
 Such a negative (though perhaps realistic) view of human nature, culture and reason may 
at first lead to despair. But as H. Richard Niebuhr points out, after despair comes conversion 
back to God, the sinner throwing himself upon God’s mercy alone (rather than upon his own 
abilities), and then the experience of “re-inscription” of the true law of God upon his heart.223 
That is the paradox—the tension—inherent within this system. The law of God “in the hands of 
men is an instrument of sin” because it can lead to pride and godless egoism, but the law “as 
coming from God and heard from His lips is a means of grace.”224 This same process of spiritual 
conversion is present in Metz’s spirituality that also focusses on the Christian’s poverty of spirit. 
It is by understanding one’s own sinfulness and how one has contributed to human suffering that 
leads one to despair in one’s own power and then, at last, to hope in God’s power.  
 This model is certainly not a synthesis between faith and culture, but neither is it a 
withdrawal from culture. That is the paradox, for the Christian is always a sinner in a sinful 
world, yet redeemed by Christ. As Richard Niebuhr states: 
                                                 
221 Ibid., 155.  
222 Ibid., 156.  
223 Ibid., 157-158.  
224 Ibid., 157.  
 
 
 
61 
 
In Christ all have become new, and yet everything remains as it was from the beginning. 
God has revealed Himself in Christ, but hidden Himself in His revelation; the believer 
knows the One in whom he has believed, yet walks by faith, not sight.225 
 
There is always a gap between creation and God that humanity can never bridge. Like the 
“Christ against culture” model, there is great resistance to the attenuation of the gospel by 
cultural or synthesist Christians precisely because the Christian Realist wants to preserve God as 
one always set apart from creation.226 Unlike the exclusionary model that promotes withdrawal 
into a perfect Christian society, the Christian Realist is under no illusion that he can escape 
culture or sin. Niebuhr sees signs of this model throughout the letters of Paul for whom humanity 
is stuck in its sin and no amount of culture can save it: “For I do not do the good I want, but the 
evil I do not want is what I do.”227 Similarly, even the law of God is corrupted by sinful flesh, for 
“God has done what the law, weakened by the flesh, could not do,” and sent his son in the 
“likeness of sinful flesh.”228  
 Any analysis of Paul’s understanding of the law and grace will be controversial, and 
Niebuhr offers one possible interpretation that fits with this presentation of the “Christ and 
culture in paradox” model.  For example, Paul contrasts works that are “fruit of the spirit” with 
“works of the flesh.”229 Paul urges Christians to exhibit the fruit of the spirit, what Niebuhr calls 
the “ethics of regeneration and eternal life.”230 But at the same time, Paul still promotes a 
culturally-based ethics about such temporal matters as marriage and divorce, relations within 
families, adjudicating quarrels, preventing factions within the community, relations to non-
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Christians and obedience to the laws of the government.231 Paul has two different sets of ethics 
because of the two different contradictory tendencies in life. Because the Christian is always 
vulnerable to sin, there must still be laws that govern behavior among sinners who need God’s 
grace.  
It is here that the view of the law for the Christian Realist is markedly different than for 
the other models. For the synthesist, the law functions positively because it can lead the human 
person to a real, though imperfect, happiness. But for Paul and other Christian Realists, the law 
has a negative function. The institutions even of Christian society are designed to prevent human 
beings from becoming more destructive than they might otherwise be.232 The laws and culture 
are designed to keep some peace and order but cannot lead the human person to happiness or 
salvation. This is Reinhold Niebuhr’s position in Moral Man and Immoral Society, for whom the 
highest moral ideal in society is justice because in a fallen world sometimes a society must use 
means such as “self-assertion, resistance, coercion.”233 For Reinhold Niebuhr, the individual 
person can and should strive toward the higher ideal of unselfishness, but like Paul, there are two 
parallel and paradoxical sets of laws because sin and grace are always in tension.  
 The obvious critique of the paradox model is that it takes sin too seriously. In today’s 
post-Modern world, as we become more aware of the systemic injustice and historical oppression 
of the poor of the world, our theology must take sin seriously. Niebuhr, Metz and the others are 
correct in this point. But rather than throwing his hands up in despair, as one could argue 
Niebuhr does, Metz instead wants to focus theology back upon the sufferings of this world and to 
reassert the biblical belief that salvation history is very much tied up in the normal course of life. 
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By focusing on the suffering of others, “social power and political dominion” must “continually 
justify themselves anew in the face of concrete suffering.”234 Indeed, this is the difficult 
consolation offered by the Gospel to the rich and powerful.235 The Gospel must challenge those 
who are apathetic toward this suffering and must pose the question to them of the extent to which 
they have caused suffering. Suffering is not merely a privatized, individual reality but a social 
and political one that demands a response by the Christian.   
 Metz begins to hint at the final model that Niebuhr deals with, “Christ the Transformer of 
Culture.” In the paradox model, creation and the fall are almost indistinguishable, for sin seems 
to corrupt all of creation at the ontological level. For somebody like Paul, there can seem to be a 
desire to escape the body and a yearning for a new order of creation “in hope that the creation 
itself will be set free from its bondage to decay.”236 This model also ignores the resurrection, 
which is precisely a raising up of the flesh to life with God. The resurrection returns material 
creation back to God; it does not abandon creation to sin. But for the Christian realist, material 
creation and human culture are so corrupted that the purpose of cultural institutions is primarily 
to restrain and limit sin’s power. It is not a surprise, then, that a Christian Realist would also tend 
to be a conservator of the status quo.237 Paul, for example, does not challenge slavery, the 
patriarchal character of the family or even the Roman government. Such transformation at the 
social level is instead the focus of the final transformational model.  
 In the transformational model there is a much more positive and hopeful outlook upon 
culture than one finds in the paradox model. One reason is that the follower of this model—what 
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we can now call the conversionist—emphasizes God’s creation at least as much as God’s 
salvation on the cross. This positive outlook supports two other related ideas: that the human 
person is a co-worker with God the first creator, and that God’s creative and ordering action has 
always been present within culture.238 This positive view of creation affects one’s Christology as 
well, for the incarnation of the Word becomes as important in salvation history as the Cross. The 
incarnation is continuous with God’s creative work through the Word.239 The resurrection, then, 
is not the rejection of creation but rather the glorification of it. Creation, incarnation and 
resurrection are distinct but interrelated moments in salvation history.  
 The conversionist tends not to believe that the fall corrupted creation at an ontological 
level. Sin and the fall is “entirely the action of man, and in no way an action of God’s.”240 
Human nature is misdirected, certainly, but it is still fundamentally good and the role of Christ is 
to convert human nature back to its originally created state. Unlike the Christian Realist, the 
focus is not on the replacement of creation by something new at the eschaton, nor is it the 
shedding of the body for a new life in the spirit, but rather it is a radical rebirth of creation in the 
present.  
 The history of salvation is portrayed as a dialogue between God and humanity. Niebuhr 
helpfully contrasts this view of history with the other models (referring to the Christian Realist as 
a “dualist”): 
 For the exclusive Christian, history is the story of a rising Church or Christian 
culture and a dying pagan civilization; for the cultural Christian, it is the story of the 
spirit’s encounter with nature; for the synthesist, it is a period of preparation under law, 
reason, gospel, and church for an ultimate communion of the soul with God; for the 
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dualist, history is the time of struggle between faith and unbelief, a period between the 
giving of the promise of life and its fulfillment. For the conversionist, history is the story 
of God’s mighty deeds and of man’s responses to them.241 
The conversionist is more focused on the “eternal now” than are the other types of Christians. 
The present is always filled with the possibility of divine renewal and is not something that will 
happen only at the eschaton. Salvation is “spatial and not temporal,” as the Lord is lifted up and 
will “draw all people” to himself.242 Certainly, all theological models believe that salvation is 
both in the present and awaiting the Parousia. The question is one of emphasis. The dualist 
(Christian Realist) tends to hold sin and grace in such tension that the ultimate victory over sin 
awaits the second coming of the Lord. This is very true and a part of traditional Christian belief. 
The conversionist tends to emphasize the present reality of God’s salvation over sin and death in 
the ongoing drama between God and humanity. This too is very true and a part of traditional 
Christian belief.  
The Gospel of John is a good example of these themes that are present in the “Christ the 
Transformer of Culture” model. Creation is inherently good because its source is in Jesus, the 
Word, but it has been corrupted by sin. This corruption, however, is not the end of the story, for 
God sends his son that all might have life through him.243 Jesus was not sent only to God’s 
chosen people, but to the entire world and to all of creation. The “world” may have rejected the 
Son, but he does not give up and glorifies God even to the cross. This continuous dialogue 
between God and humanity exemplifies how Jesus is always present in the eternal now. Eternal 
life with God in the Spirit is possible in every living moment.244 
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This idea that human culture can be transformed for the glory of God is present 
throughout the Gospel of John. The gospel uses Hellenistic concepts such as “logos” to 
communicate to the culture in that culture’s own symbols and language. But it also re-interprets 
those symbols in the light of Christ and transforms their meaning.245 It also uses the material 
world as a means of  revealing who God is. Eating, drinking, wind, water, bread and wine are all 
symbolic of a deeper spiritual reality.246 The wedding at Cana, the first of Jesus’ signs, reveals 
his glory through the transformation of water into wine.247 The material world is inherently good 
and Jesus redeems it and lifts it up to its true purpose, that of glorifying God. There is always a 
double reality in the Gospel: the surface level of events signified by the material world, and their 
deeper, spiritual reality that is hidden behind the material one.   
 The author of John certainly has many seemingly negative comments about the “world” 
and its rejection of the Son of God. For example, Jesus says to the Jewish leaders that their father 
is the devil and has put them in opposition to him.248 This theme of the “world” rejecting Jesus 
begins at the prologue and runs throughout the gospel: “his own people did not accept him.”249 
However, these verses must be put in the context of the theme of dialogue between God and 
humanity. Creation responds to Jesus by rejecting him, but Jesus’ response is to offer himself for 
the world: “here is the Lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world!”250 Jesus comes to lay 
down his life, and Caiaphas responds that it is better that one man should die than a whole 
nation.251 Humanity consistently rejects Christ’s offer of salvation. However, unlike the other 
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models, Jesus does not withdraw into his own pure community of disciples, nor does he suggest 
that the “battle” between him and the world is unwinnable in the present time. Rather, salvation 
is still possible by returning to proper relationship with God. 
 Like the “kingdom of God” metaphor in the other gospels, “eternal life” is the phrase 
used in the Gospel of John to talk about present communion with the Father and the Son through 
the Spirit.252 Rather than focusing on the return of Christ on the last day, the author focusses on 
the giving of the Spirit to the Christian community after the resurrection: “and I will ask the 
Father, and he will give you another Advocate, to be with you forever.”253 Once again, one can 
see that the focus in the Gospel is less upon the past or the future but upon the present moment 
that is already filled with God’s glory. That glory may not be visible to most of the “world,” but 
it is visible to those who possess the knowledge to see it. 
The differences between the last three models that try to hold Christ and culture together 
are rather nuanced. The difference lies in how they see the role of Christ in transforming the 
culture.254 For the synthesist, the transformation proceeds by adding Christ to a culture that is 
already good and supplementing the limited natural powers of reason. For the Christian Realist, 
Christ does not change the culture but rather helps the individual to live within an irrevocably 
immoral society. But on the continuum developed earlier, “Christ the Transformer of Culture” 
would lie between the synthesist model in the middle and the “Christ of culture” model at the 
end. The adherent to the transformational model agrees with the Christian Realist that culture is 
under God’s rule, but he or she is closer to the cultural model because of the belief that 
Christians must still engage the culture in order to convert it to Christ. The focus is not so much 
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on supplementing the natural powers of reason but upon re-directing a corrupted creation back to 
its original state. Salvation is salvation in the world, not salvation from the world. 
 Especially in a nation built upon the non-establishment of any Church, it is not at all clear 
how a Church seeking to order the whole of the temporal sphere could exert any amount of 
power over the national culture. The synthetic model, for example, presumes a social unification 
that has not been the case since the thirteenth century. The model cannot be imported wholesale 
into the contemporary Church. As such influential thinkers as Charles Taylor have pointed out, it 
was “virtually impossible not to believe in God” for much of the history of the Western world, 
but now such atheism is not only easy but even “inescapable.”255 In today’s culture, the only 
power the Church has is through persuasion and appeals to reason.  
The reality of the world today is one reason why Gaudium et Spes (GS) is such an 
important resource for examining more closely how the Church should relate to the culture in 
today’s world. A respect for reason and culture is present throughout the document. As such, GS 
builds upon the “intelligible basis” that the synthetic model provides while responding to the 
cultural reality of its day.256 GS presumes that human culture is good, that it can lead people 
toward God and that Christ is the goal of all cultures. It contains a positive view of creation, of 
culture and a firm belief that the human person is still perfectible in Christ. Communion with 
God is possible here and now, in the world. At the same time, the document acknowledges the 
presence of elements within all cultures that are sinful and must be redeemed by Christ. It is not 
naïve about the presence and power of sin.  
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The document also builds upon the insights of the “Christ the Transformer of Culture” 
model. In particular, its use of the concept of dialogue is a fruitful lens to think about the 
relationship of the Church to culture today. Dialogue is a concept that runs throughout the 
document. As we have already seen, the conversionist model presumes that salvation history is a 
continual dialogue between humanity and God. God does not impose salvation upon creation. GS 
builds upon this characteristic of the divine-human drama to present the Church as a promoter of 
the conversion of culture through Christ.  
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Chapter 3, “an acknowledgement of history” 
Bernard Lonergan stated that the meaning of Vatican II was the “acknowledgment of 
history.”257 Since the French revolution, the Church had been overtly hostile to much of the 
change occurring around it. Popes Pius VI, Gregory XVI, Pius IX, Leo XIII, Pius X, Pius XI and 
Pius XII were all united in their belief that the “task of the church in the modern world” was to 
restore the world back to Christ and to his Church.258 This anti-Modernist movement of the 
Catholic Church was actually a cultural Christianity that sought to return the Church and the 
world to the thirteenth century. Church leaders had a difficult time recognizing that culture had 
changed so much that the medieval synthesis between the Church and culture was no longer 
possible. Its response was to withdraw from culture as much as possible by forming an alternate 
Catholic society within the larger Western culture.259 This parallel society would both protect 
Catholics from the poison of modern forms of thinking and form a spiritual army to fight in the 
battle “to restore all things in Christ.”260 The Church had moved to a “Christ against culture” 
model while yearning to restore a “Christ above culture” model.  
This institutional blindness to historical change was apparent in the preparatory schemas 
at Vatican II that continued to focus upon the Church (ad intra) at the expense of the Church’s 
relationship to the world (ad extra). Even the title of the preparatory draft on the church, De 
Ecclesia, revealed this defensive and polemical approach. Cardinal Suenens, the Archbishop of 
Malines-Brussels, made a key intervention at the first session of the Council when he declared 
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that the bishops should focus outward in addition to focusing inward. In that address the Cardinal 
provided a methodological way forward for the Council by providing a program around which 
both the internal and the external concerns could cohere. He also introduced the concept of 
“dialogue” to describe relationships of the Church with its members and with the 
world.261 According to O’Malley, this intervention was foundational because it laid the 
groundwork for the adoption of dialogical language throughout the documents.262 Another 
“across-the-board” issue that O’Malley identified at the Council was its acknowledgement and 
engagement with social change.263 These two themes, dialogue and change, would shape the 
entire Council and run throughout its documents. They also reveal the shift from a “Christ 
against culture” model to a “Christ the Transformer of Culture” model. This model is very much 
at the center of Gaudium et Spes (GS). In order to bring all of these threads together, it is helpful 
to look at Henri de Lubac as representative of the nouvelle théologie movement just before the 
Council, the Church’s eventual acceptance of many of their principles at the Council and the 
theological paradigm shift behind this change. 
 Joseph A. Komonchak states that this shift was a consequence of questioning the reigning 
Neo-Thomism of the time. He particularly identifies Henri de Lubac and his book Surnaturel as 
exemplary of a larger theological movement that would come to promote a “return to the 
sources” (ressourcement) and the dialogue of theology with the contemporary world.264 This 
general movement, called la nouvelle théologie by its detractors, would be officially codified at 
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Vatican II. In fact, many of these same theologians who were disciplined prior to the Council for 
promoting such ideas would attend the Council as theological experts.265     
 De Lubac’s primary concern was that theology had separated itself from its “human 
roots…as if God was not the author of both nature and grace, and nature in view of grace.”266 
This strict separation of nature and grace was reflected in the theological method itself. 
Apologetics became the mode of discourse for all encounters of faith and the world outside the 
Church with its “system of truths and precepts” whose only purpose was to defend the Church 
and her declared truths.267 Theology itself, as the science of revealed truths, was no longer an 
“understanding of all reality through the faith.”268 In fact, to argue that the role of theology was 
to “display the inner intelligibility” of Christian doctrine and its ability to interpret all of reality 
was to risk being accused of confusing the natural and the supernatural realms.269 What had 
begun under Aquinas as the synthesis between nature and God’s grace (super-nature) that 
completed and brought nature to its fulfillment, evolved instead into a system in which the 
supernatural was shunted off into an independent realm whose custodian was the Church.270 The 
Church’s primarily role was to mediate grace from the realm of the supernatural into the realm of 
the natural. Thus, de Lubac wrote, there arose a “sort of unconscious conspiracy between the 
movement which led to secularism and a certain theology.”271 Secularism, the belief that the 
religious and political forces in society should be strictly separated, was reinforced—and perhaps 
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even accelerated—on the side of the Church by this theological separation between the natural 
and supernatural spheres.  
 De Lubac saw the crux of the theological separation beginning in the sixteenth century 
with Cajetan’s interpretation of Aquinas. In short, Aquinas always viewed the human soul as 
possessing a “natural desire for the beatific vision.”272 However, starting in the sixteenth century, 
there arose a “materialization of spirit” which conceived of the human soul as simply another 
“nature” with its own proportionate desires.273 Much like the body has natural desires for food 
and procreation, so too the soul has natural desires for intellection and rational investigation. 
Reason was a natural power, not a supernatural one, and therefore it could never reach the desire 
for the beatific vision by itself. Such a desire must come from outside of the soul and outside the 
natural world. There was a definitive break between the “natural” powers of the soul and the 
“supernatural” powers which must be added to the soul by God’s grace.  
De Lubac saw this philosophical evolution as understandable, for Aquinas never 
succeeded in combining Aristotle’s conception of the soul as “spiritual nature” with the Patristic 
understanding of the soul as the “image” of its creator. For Aristotle, spiritual nature was 
analogous to physical nature and the soul was its own “center of properties and a source of 
strictly delimited activity.”274 For the Patristic theologians, however, the human soul was not at 
all like the body, but rather always open to the infinite, striving to fulfill its true nature as the 
likeness (image) of God.275 For Aristotle, then, the idea that the soul could “naturally” seek what 
was beyond its own powers was absurd. All natures possess ends that are attainable by their own 
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intrinsic powers. For the Patristic theologians who were not limited by such an understanding of 
“nature,” the idea that the soul was created to seek a supernatural end beyond its intrinsic powers 
was not absurd at all. De Lubac was not critical of Aquinas for siding with the Patristic thinkers 
by identifying the desire for the beatific vision within the human soul. The problem for de Lubac 
was that the stricter Aristotelian understanding of “nature” upon which Aquinas based his 
theology provided a philosophical opening for subsequent theologians to reduce the desires of 
the soul to what could be accounted for by its natural powers that sought only an end 
proportionate to its delimited nature. 
Cajetan and other later thinkers posited a hypothetical condition of the human person 
which they called “pure nature.” This condition of “pure nature” described the human person 
before the addition of supernatural grace. This philosophical construction allowed them to stress 
the human person’s natural powers over and against the supernatural. These philosophical and 
theological bifurcations of reality between the natural and the supernatural became part of the 
larger cultural shift during the Enlightenment, the rise of secular nation-states and the birth of 
science as a secular discipline. The Church, theology and the supernatural became more and 
more separate from reason, secular political institutions and empirical investigations of reality. 
This theological split between nature and super-nature contributed to the development in general 
of secularized constructions of the human world that also presumed a separation of nature and 
grace.276   
According to de Lubac, theology had neglected Aquinas’ insight that the human person, 
as made “in the image and likeness of God,” already possessed a desire for the beatific vision. 
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The human person at creation is already a graced being.277 There is no “pure nature” in need of 
perfection by external grace. De Lubac rejected an ontological dualism that strictly separated 
reality into nature and super-nature: “the whole natural order…is already penetrated by a 
supernatural.”278 This insight that God already graces the natural world from its creation would 
be foundational for many theologians such as Karl Rahner in the twentieth century.  
De Lubac was also critical of a medieval focus on dialectical theology that stressed the 
use of reason and argumentation over the Patristic understanding of theological language as 
symbolic of a deeper reality: “symbolic inclusions became dialectical antitheses.”279 The role of 
reason in dialectical theology was solely to demonstrate the existence of God and to support the 
defense of the Church and her doctrines in apologetical discourse with those outside the Church. 
Theology, on the other hand, was the investigation of sacred, revealed truths and had little to do 
with the secular world. Another bifurcation arose within the Church, this time between sacred 
theology and profane apologetics.280 
If de Lubac is correct, then the secularization of society was accelerated by a theological 
dualism that separated the world into the realm of the “sacred” and the “profane.” This dualism 
supported much of Catholic anti-modernism during the long nineteenth century and pushed the 
Church to interpret historical events in very negative ways. For example, as Komonchak points 
out, the Church conflated what he calls “doctrinaire liberalism” with “political liberalism.”281 
“Political liberalism,” as promoted by John Courtney Murray who identified it primarily with the 
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Anglo-Saxon liberal tradition, merely sought to separate the church and the political state.282 It 
was not inherently anti-religious. On the other hand, “doctrinaire liberalism” was a totalizing 
ideology that understood the separation of the church and the state also to imply the “irrelevance 
of religion to the public order and the sole right of the state to control all aspects of public 
life.”283 This kind of liberalism was often associated with European liberalism and the Catholic 
persecutions that occurred in post-revolutionary France. As de Lubac lamented, this total 
secularization of society was a natural consequence of the growing autonomy of politics, 
economics and culture in general from the dictates of religious authorities. And he showed that 
this process of secularization had begun in the centuries immediately after Aquinas.   
What Murray distinguished was the difference between the separation of the church and 
the state from the separation of the church and the society.284 Murray always believed that the 
Church had an important public role in forming the “social consensus” that undergirded any 
society. He described the “social consensus” in the following way: 
It is an ensemble of substantive truths, a structure of basic knowledge, an order of 
elementary affirmations that reflect realities inherent in the order of existence...This 
consensus is the institutional a priori of all the rationalities and technicalities of 
constitutional and statutory law. It furnishes the premises of the people’s action in history 
and defines the larger aims which that action seeks in internal affairs and in external 
relations. 285 
This basic agreement within the culture is constitutive of any society that wants to achieve 
human flourishing. These rational influences are passed down in society as its patrimony, as its 
basic agreement of what is true, and it is these truths about which people in society can then 
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argue. It is an achievement both of reason and of experience. People must live together on the 
basis of these truths from generation to generation.  
Barbarism threatens when people cease living together “according to reason, embodied in 
law and custom, and incorporated in a web of institutions” that reveal rational influences.286 This 
reason manifests in morality, politics and religious convictions that guide society. When reason 
ceases to unite society under a common agreement, then society instead falls under the rule of 
force and fear, economic interests and technological domination.287 Fundamental questions of 
values and reality then become secondary to faith in the democratic processes themselves: “all 
issues of human life…are to be regarded as, or resolved into, political issues and are to be settled 
by…majority vote.”288 Murray fears that the basic philosophical and moral differences at that 
point will no longer be publicly adjudicable because faith in reason will have collapsed.289 
Many American thinkers believe that our society has reached the point at which the 
“social consensus” no longer functions as a unifying feature of public American life. Instead, any 
claims to transcendent norms are merely matters of personal decisions, and any attempt to 
impose such norms upon society is a breach of the secular nature of civil life. This “naked public 
square,” as Richard John Neuhaus described it, must remain a space for people of all faiths and 
no faith.290 Religious claims should remain privatized and separate from the larger social sphere. 
Metz and other critics of modernism, however, point out that economic concerns have silently 
become the prevailing ideology of Western society. The human person is merely an object, a cog 
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in the machine of technological process. One’s value is instead based upon how efficiently a 
person contributes to the goals of economic and technological “progress.” 
Pluralist, liberal democracy is now the primary political arrangement of societies around 
the world. Such regimes are built upon fundamental, non-negotiable values of human rights, 
equality, the rule of law and democracy. But because there is no longer a “social consensus” as 
Murray envisioned it, the justifying reasons for sharing these values are no longer common 
across individuals in society. The secularized culture actively resists any imposition of private 
moral or religious perspectives. There exists a plurality of these reasonable but incompatible 
perspectives, what John Rawls calls “comprehensive doctrines.”291 He argues that, because of the 
secularization of liberal democracies, the state must be neutral toward these perspectives. As 
long as these perspectives share fundamental liberal values, these individuals can still engage 
with one another from their diverse perspectives by forming together what Rawls calls an 
“overlapping consensus” of such comprehensive doctrines.292 A Christian’s comprehensive 
doctrine is much different than a Muslim’s or an atheist’s, but even though their justifying 
reasons are incompatible, the fact that each perspective can support a shared understanding of 
fundamental liberal values unifies society. 
Even though Rawls uses the term “consensus,” he means something very different from 
Murray’s use of that term. Murray believed that the natural law that was knowable through 
human reason could form the basis of the social consensus in a pluralist society. For Murray, 
then, there would be basic agreement on the fundamental truths about reality and morality. Rawls 
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presents a much thinner view of consensus. He drastically limits the scope of the consensus to 
the fundamental liberal values of human rights, equality, democracy and the rule of law. He is 
indifferent to the substance of one’s deepest convictions. Rawls only cares that there is a 
minimum set of shared values to ensure a minimal level of cohesion within society. Religious 
claims remain privatized and outside the realm of the public sphere. In Gaudium et Spes, the 
Council fathers will promote the alliance of the Church with these liberal values identified by 
Rawls. However, they will reject Rawlsian privatization of religion and instead promote the 
influence of the Gospel in the public sphere. At the same time, the Church will affirm the 
autonomy of the political sphere. Instead, they will embrace a dialogical model of 
communication that allows the Church to find its place in the world as an active participant in 
pluralist, liberal democracies.293 This dialogical style will enhance the Church’s credibility in a 
religiously diverse world and, in so doing, will enhance the Church’s ability to bring the Gospel 
to bear upon Modernity’s excesses, disvalues and false idols.  
Niebuhr’s typology is helpful in this analysis of the Church’s reaction to these larger 
cultural forces. How one understands the connection between the natural and supernatural, 
between nature and grace, will influence how one views the relationship between faith and 
culture. If culture is corrupt at the ontological level, then the Church has a duty to resist it lest the 
Christian endanger his or her soul. In this light, the preservation of a societas perfecta of the 
church during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries makes sense. The Church rejected a culture 
that it saw as hostile, as taken over by “doctrinaire liberalism” that had no place for religious 
claims. However, as is the case with all sectarian groups, it did not wholly reject the culture. As 
Komonchak has observed, even while the Church was highly critical of the nation-state, it also 
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borrowed many of its organizational features such as centralization and bureaucracy. For 
example, it defined the primacy of the pope at Vatican I in terms of modern monarchical models 
and revised its Code of Canon Law accordingly.294 The Church formed an alternate society with 
an anti-liberal ideology. Catholic organizations and movements ensured that Catholics were 
immunized from the poison of a godless society. In its rejection of the surrounding culture, it was 
modeling part of the “Christ against culture” paradigm.  
But the tendency of the community in the “Christ against culture” model is to believe that 
God is only present within the community and that the culture has been left to the powers of the 
antichrist. Culture in this model is irredeemably godless. But the Church rejected this extreme 
implication of the “Christ against Culture” model that separated God the creator from God the 
redeemer and sanctifier of creation. Instead, the Church could not help but approach the issue 
from the very Catholic “Christ above culture” paradigm. The Church retreated from culture not 
to abandon it but to repair it. By forming its own ideal society based upon the proper use of 
human reason, it could then create properly Catholic institutions: hospitals, schools, colleges, 
clubs and societies, youth organizations, Catholic-run businesses, and a “flourishing” Catholic 
press.295 It formed a parallel society, modeled a great deal upon the surrounding culture, but a 
purified and properly religious one. It was in many ways the medieval society in miniature, a 
model of how the Church desired to remake the larger culture and also an instrument of that 
cultural rejuvenation. God was still present in God’s creation. Human reason and its culture may 
have gone too far in one direction, but it was redeemable. Creation remained ontologically good 
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and grace could still build upon nature. The Church’s job was to sweep away much of the 
accreted cultural dust. 
Typologies are necessarily artificial attempts to model ambiguous reality. The categories 
are leaky and no one person or school of thought completely fits within one type. This is 
certainly the case for the American Catholic Church preceding Vatican II. As de Lubac had 
already identified, much of Western culture had long ago separated the sphere of the supernatural 
from temporal concerns. The Church mirrored this dualism both in theological method and in 
theological content. Its theological dualism helped to place the Church in an adversarial role with 
culture, somewhere on Richard Niebuhr’s spectrum between the synthesist model in the center 
and the exclusionary model at the far end. It also shared aspects with the paradox model. It 
believed that society was godless and had gone off the rails due both to the sins of liberalism and 
also of communism (which Pius IX had condemned as early 1864 in the encyclical Quanta 
Cura).296 Both political systems failed because they placed reason above revelation and 
humanity above God. In its skepticism of reason and human progress, the Church shared much 
with Christian Realists such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Metz. Reinhold Niebuhr rightly cautioned 
that the Modern focus on reason, science and technological progress had not necessarily made 
the world a more humane place. Sin was always going to enter into social arrangements and 
culture would never be able to save itself. Society had rejected both the proper role of God and 
of God’s Church. Human rationality, run amok, had led to anti-religious, relativistic chaos. 
The Church could not accommodate a culture that had lost God’s grace when it rejected 
the role of the Church as its guiding light at the French Revolution. But the Church did not hold 
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nature and grace in tension until the eschaton, as if in a waiting room (to use Metz’s image).297 
Like Metz, the Church desired to change the culture, to place the world back on the right track. 
But its preferred method of returning to medieval “Christendom” was no longer possible. The 
institutional Church of the 1950’s was blind to many of the cultural and social changes that made 
such a synthetic model impossible. As Herberg points out, after World War II and the GI Bill 
Catholics became more educated, affluent and socially respectable. Catholicism was now a 
legitimate expression of the American Way of Life. The ghettoized, “father knows best” 
mentality of the “Christ above culture” no longer fit the social reality.298 However, instead of 
moving more toward a paradox model, the Church instead embraced the conversionist model of 
“Christ the Transformer of Culture” at Vatican II. 
It remains open question as to why the Church moved toward the conversionist model 
rather than the paradox model. One reason might be that the belief that “grace perfects nature” 
was so ingrained in the Catholic worldview that it did not allow for the metaphysical split 
between nature and grace that the paradox model presumes. In the paradox model, sin is so 
corrupting of creation that the Christian’s ultimate hope is in salvation at the eschaton. Reinhold 
Niebuhr and others did seek to change the culture, but they were always aware of the limits of 
their attempts. Sin’s corruption is too deep. It can ever be uprooted entirely in history. But in its 
attempt to take sin seriously, the paradox model often focuses almost completely upon Jesus’ 
salvific action on the cross but pays little attention to the Incarnation and to Christ’s resurrection 
of the flesh. There is a very sharp dualism between nature and grace, creation and salvation. 
However, for a Catholicism that grounds God’s grace in the material reality of sacraments, such 
                                                 
297 Metz, A Passion for God, 84. 
298 Massa, 99-100.  
 
 
 
83 
 
a sharp distinction between creation and grace is much more difficult to maintain. To quote de 
Lubac again, “the whole natural order, not only in man but in man’s destiny, is already 
penetrated by a supernatural which works upon him and draws him on.”299 God’s grace is present 
in and through material reality, and even though we must take sin seriously, there is always room 
for God’s grace to manifest itself in the world. The Christian realist is very pessimistic about 
sin’s power in creation; the conversionist is very optimistic about God’s power in creation.  
Many of the documents at Vatican II can be used to support this argument that a “Christ 
the Transformer of Culture” model underlies much of the Church’s theology behind its 
engagement with culture. For the sake of space, however, I will only focus on one of the most 
important documents, Gaudium et Spes (GS).300 Immediately, GS rings with hope when it states 
at the beginning: 
The joys and hopes, the grief and anguish of the people of our time…are the joys and 
hopes, the grief and anguish of the followers of Christ as well. Nothing that is genuinely 
human fails to find an echo in their hearts.301 
It places the Church in solidarity with global humanity. There is a broad and deep Christian 
humanism that consistently highlights the dignity of the human person and the importance of 
human freedom and responsibility: “nothing that is genuinely human fails to find an echo” in the 
heart of the Church.302  This openness to humanity is further reinforced when the document 
declares that the Church’s mission is “reading the signs of the times” and “interpreting them in 
light of the Gospel.”303 These examples show how differently the Church has positioned itself 
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vis-à-vis culture since the anti-Modernist crisis. The Church no longer sees itself as an adversary 
of the surrounding culture. At the same time, it does not engage the culture wholesale, but 
discerns what is from God. This “reading of the signs of the times” sets up a dynamic between 
the Church and the culture that is appreciative of many cultural achievements. It does not 
presume that evangelization and cultural transformation only goes one way from the Church to 
the world.  
 One way this reciprocal dynamic is apparent is in the document’s many uses of the word 
“dialogue” (dialog) and the word “conversation” (colloquium). Dialogue is a conversation of 
deep listening in which one party does not seek to dominate or win an argument. The goal in a 
dialogue is that each side of the conversation understands the other person’s perspective. 
Dialogue assumes that both sides of the conversation can learn from each other. Similarly, in the 
dialogue between the Church and culture both sides have something to learn from each other. 
The Church hopes that through mutual understanding it can persuade individuals in the culture to 
embrace the values of the Gospel. At the very least, it can contribute to human flourishing by 
positively affecting the orientation and development of society as a whole.  
The Church wishes to enter into “dialogue” with humanity in order to shine the light of 
the Gospel and to supply humanity with the “saving resources” of the Church.304 Human 
achievements do not “rival the creator,” but are “signs of God’s goodness and the fulfillment of 
his mysterious design.”305 This is clearer later in the document, where the authors state that the 
Church can receive a “great variety of help” both from individuals and from society as a 
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whole.306 This help from outside the Church includes the concepts and languages with which to 
adapt the Gospel message, experts in the world who can propose solutions to social problems and 
aid from the modern “evolutions of social life” which help the Church to understand its own 
constitution better.307 In a remarkable statement, the authors declare that the Church “depends on 
things outside itself” and especially upon people who contribute to the development of the 
human community at the level of family, culture, economic and social life, and national and 
international politics.308 No longer is the Church its own perfect society, complete unto itself. 
The Church needs the positive developments of culture which themselves are also part of God’s 
mysterious plan. At the same time, GS is not naïve about the role of sin in human culture. It 
states, “good and evil intermingle,” that “the whole of human history has been the story of dour 
combat with the powers of evil.”309 Yet, at the same time, the Church accepts that “progress can 
contribute to humanity’s true happiness” even though these human activities must be “purified 
and perfected” by the Paschal mystery.310 The mission of the Church in the world is to work with 
these good elements of the culture, to purify them by the Gospel and to direct them toward their 
ultimate, transcendent end.  
 The document also takes great pains to address the modern issue of secularization in the 
culture. Rather than creating an either/or relationship to culture, the Council Fathers began to 
make distinctions. A certain amount of autonomy was indeed part of God plan: 
Many of our contemporaries seem to fear that a close association between human activity 
and religion will endanger the autonomy of humanity….If by autonomy of earthly affairs 
is meant the gradual discovery, utilization and ordering of the laws and values of matter 
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and society, then the demand for autonomy is perfectly in order: it is at once the claim of 
humankind today and the desire of the creator….because the things of the world and the 
things of faith derive from the same God.311 
Rather than culture being all good or all bad, it is a mix. Freedom in the world and obedience to 
God are compatible because both are part of God’s plan for creation.  
The Council Fathers began to distinguish between “doctrinaire liberalism” which had no 
room for God and “political liberalism” which merely preserved the autonomy of the political 
sphere from the ecclesial: “the political community and the Church are autonomous and 
independent of each other in their own fields.”312 Thus, the Council refused to commit itself to 
any one culture, political, economic or social system.313 The Church supports any social system 
that best promotes the Gospel’s values in society. This acceptance of political liberalism would 
be fully embraced by Dignitatis Humanae (authored by John Courtney Murray). Dignitatis 
Humanae would embrace not only political liberalism but also religious freedom. Ratzinger, 
calling the document a “counter-syllabus” in reference to Pius IX’s Syllabus of Errors, realized 
that this was the Church’s repudiation of its adversarial stance during the long nineteenth-
century. 314 At Vatican II the Church finally surrender its vision “Christendom” and had to find 
another way to effect cultural conversion in the light of the Gospel.   
 At the heart of GS is a belief in the perfectibility of culture and the human person by 
Christ. For this reason, “Christ the Transformer of Culture” model should instead be called the 
“Christ the Converter of Culture” model. Transformation can imply that what was present before 
no longer exists after a change. Conversion, however, is more about re-direction, taking what is 
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good and orienting it back toward God. Indeed, the concept of dialogue demands such a 
viewpoint because dialogue is not about the imposition of one’s opinion by force or coercion. It 
involves mutual sharing, understanding, and deep listening.  
 The purpose of dialogue is to continue the incarnational mission of Christ. As James 
McEvoy points out, the theme of dialogue with the world was not new in GS but was first 
highlighted by Paul VI in his 1964 encyclical Ecclesiam Suam. Paul VI then pushed for the 
term’s inclusion in the final drafts of GS.315 In that encyclical, Paul VI states that just as God had 
initiated a “dialogue of salvation” with humanity, so too does the Church enters into a dialogue 
with humanity in order to continue that same work of salvation.316 This incarnational theme is 
echoed in GS when it states that the Church wishes only to “carry on the work of Christ…who 
came into the world to bear witness to the truth….”317 God the Father sent his Son to be with 
humanity and to continue the dialogue of salvation that began with Adam and Eve. This 
relationship of extended conversation and interaction with God is a major theme in salvation 
history and is a defining characteristic in Niebuhr’s typology: “For the conversionist, history is 
the story of God’s mighty deeds and of man’s responses to them.”318 The conversionist model 
seeks the transformation of society, both of individuals and of institutions.  
In the synthesist model, the content of history was relatively meaningless. It was the stage 
upon which the Church acted. The Church’s mission was to apply the principles of the Gospel to 
social institutions and practices. Grace was extrinsic to creation, something added to nature in 
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order to bridge the gap between creation and God. If GS had only presented dialogue as a one-
way conversation about what the Church could offer the world, then one could make the 
argument that the synthesist model of bridging the gap between creation and God was still 
partially in the background. Christendom’s goal was the merging of the secular and religious 
spheres in order “bring the whole of humanity under the law of Christ.”319 During the anti-
Modernist movement in the Church, the Church was reflexively against social developments 
because it already possessed the answers and only needed to impose them upon society.  
This polemical stance is abandoned by GS for a greater appreciation of how God has 
always been responsive to humanity’s particular historical circumstances. History is an intrinsic 
dimension of the way God and the Church acts in the world.320 Just as the Incarnation is always 
particular to a time and place, so too must the Church continue to be responsive to humanity’s 
particular circumstances and its particular questions. The emphasis in GS on “reading the signs 
of the times,” which comes directly from John XXIII’s 1963 encyclical Pacem in Terris, arises 
from a belief that history and grace are intrinsic to the nature and mission of the Church. 
“Reading the signs of the times” is a tool by which the Church incarnates itself into every 
culture. It is a method of interpreting historical events “in the light of the Gospel” in order to 
“answer the ever recurring questions which people ask about the meaning of this present life and 
the life to come” and to do so in “language intelligible to every generation.”321 God’s grace is 
already present in the history of cultures. The Church desires to enter into that work and to work 
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with that divine grace. The Church acts in history in this way because this is the way that God 
acts in history.322  
De Lubac recognized how much secularization and theology had worked together to 
place God’s grace outside of the everyday realities of history and human life. Such an 
ontological scheme easily supported a synthesist model in which grace built upon a graceless 
nature. However, as de Lubac pointed out, Aquinas never believed that there was a state of “pure 
nature” in which grace was not yet present. This theological insight undergirds the approach of 
the Council Fathers who affirm that social unity and cooperation are clear signs of the “faith and 
love” founded upon the Holy Spirit.323 The Spirit of God is active and present in modernity, and 
it is present even before any action of the Church. Grace is an intrinsic part of creation and all 
human cultures. The Church’s mission is not to add grace to a godless culture, but to respond to 
the grace already present. 
Following Charles Taylor, McEvoy identifies three primary ways that the “social 
imaginary” changed during the transition from the medieval to the modern period: the rise of the 
modern economy, the rise of popular sovereignty (democracy) and the rise of the public (secular) 
sphere.324 The bishops accepted these profound cultural changes, though not uncritically, at the 
Council. They admitted that the modern capitalist economy could improve the common good as 
long as human dignity continued to be respected and fostered.325 They accepted democracy as 
“fully in accord with human nature,” and they accepted the secular autonomy of the State as 
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important in a pluralist society.326 These were fundamental shifts away from the synthesist model 
and toward the new dialogical paradigm.  
This paradigm hews very close to Niebuhr’s conversionist model because it seeks to 
change culture from the inside. The Church’s mission is to enter into a mutual dialogue with the 
culture, recognizing where the Spirit is already present, and to interpret particular historical 
circumstances in the light of the gospel. This paradigm presumes that both the Church and the 
world can learn something valuable from each other, and that God’s grace is already present in 
both spheres. Rather than a conflictual relationship, the Church wants to work with the culture to 
build up God’s kingdom both as a society and as individuals in need of their own personal 
conversion back to Christ. This conversion must be accomplished through persuasion and 
witnessing to the Gospel rather than through political and social control. Far from only critiquing 
modernity as a “dictatorship of relativism,” the Church seeks to embrace the parts of modernity 
that are good (regulated capitalism, democracy, political liberalism) while rejecting those parts 
that harm the dignity of human beings (exploitation, oppression, ideological liberalism).  
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Conclusion, an “echo in their hearts” 
The Church today cannot expect to return to a model of medieval Christendom. It also 
cannot embrace either extreme on Richard Niebuhr’s continuum. It can neither completely 
withdraw from culture nor capitulate entirely to it. The Church must both be prophetic when 
necessary but also engage the culture. Niebuhr’s “Christ the Transformer of Culture” 
(conversionist) model is the way that the Church has chosen to strike this balance. The other 
option of Christian Realism suffers from a dualism that separates the concerns of the individual 
moral life from the concerns of social ethics. In the paradox model, culture and every human 
heart is so corrupted by sin that the best one can hope for is an individual conversion. The sinner 
realizes that he or she must fall upon God’s mercy. Any hope of moral change at the social level, 
however, is misguided at best. Laws and social order exist merely to tame the sinful impulses of 
humanity, not to build up the kingdom of God on earth. The Kingdom of God will reign when 
the sovereign Lord comes at the end of time with his unmerited salvation for humanity. For 
somebody like Reinhold Niebuhr, we must live in the tension between grace and sin, this world 
and the next.  
GS, however, lifts up a Christian humanism that is both fully Christian and fully human. 
It is in the “mystery of the Word made flesh that the mystery of humanity truly becomes 
clear.”327 All human beings see their dignity and true vocation in the light of the Incarnation. 
And if the Incarnation is the ideal model of the human person, then it is also the ideal model for a 
Church that seeks to enter into the lives of all human persons. The Church offers Christ as the 
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answer to their “recurring questions about the meaning of this life and the next.”328 By engaging 
the culture, the Church can both remain relevant and speak with a prophetic voice.  
GS tries to remain realistic about sin while acknowledging the victory of the resurrected 
Jesus over sin and death. It points out the many challenges to human flourishing that the cultural 
changes have produced. Culture is always ambiguous and the same cultural achievements that 
the Council embraced also can be causes of great suffering in society: economic inequality, war, 
violence and consumerism. It recognizes that Jesus is both the Lord of creation and the Master 
who taught his disciples that the kingdom of heaven was at hand.329 But it is precisely as the 
Risen One that Jesus has already conquered sin and death. Even though Christian hope looks 
forward to God’s final victory over sin and death, “it is a mistake to think that...we are entitled to 
evade our earthly responsibilities.”330 If the resurrection of the flesh means anything, it means the 
salvation of humanity in the world and not from the world. 
The contrast with Christian Realism must be nuanced. Proponents of the paradox model 
such as Niebuhr did not deny salvation in the present world—the human person is both always a 
sinner and justified. If anything, GS is far too optimistic about the cultural situation and ignores 
the limitations of human nature in transforming culture. Niebuhr is very clear that human self-
interest and egoism will always prevent cultures from achieving perfect justice and perfect love. 
Christian Realism acknowledges the presence of sin in the world and in the human person. It 
emphasizes that complete salvation can only come at the eschaton when Christ is “all in all” and 
has fully conquered sin. There is not as much sense in the paradox model that God is already at 
                                                 
328 Ibid., 4.  
329 Mt. 3:2. 
330 GS, 43. 
 
 
 
93 
 
work through the Spirit in creation. The Paschal mystery of Jesus’ life, suffering, death and 
resurrection has already transformed the order of creation and thus gives hope for the world’s 
further transformation in the future.  
GS pushes a strong interaction with culture that comes from a desire within the Church to 
break out of its nineteenth-century isolationist mentality and to work across religious boundaries 
with people of other faiths or even with people of no faith. GS recognized that the Holy Spirit 
offers to “all the possibility of being made partners, in a way known to God, in the paschal 
mystery.”331 Christians are encouraged to “gladly cooperate” with others who are working 
toward the same objectives.332 Once again, the Council calls upon the use of dialogue as 
individual Christians guide others in a spirit of “mutual charity” and with a “genuine concern for 
the common good above all.”333 In a pluralist culture, it is vital that the Church work with and 
reach out to people of other faiths and, especially, to atheists and agnostics who more and more 
make up a larger proportion of the population. They too are made in the image of God and must 
be engaged in a spirit of charitable dialogue.  
Dialogue is the means through which a diverse people can develop a common life. 
Through this shared conversation people can identify their shared humanity and their shared 
identity that unites them into a community. They develop a common life that is necessary for the 
social cohesion which holds democratic societies together.334 But because the Church has also 
granted autonomy to the political sphere, it can no longer promote this cohesion by determining 
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social arrangements itself. It must instead become an active participant alongside others, 
contributing to the development of a pluralist social order.335  
Pope Francis has promoted the deep listening that dialogue requires by urging that clergy 
(and really all Christians) live with the “odor of the sheep.”336 He has consistently encouraged 
the Church to go to the margins, to be a Church “that is poor and for the poor.”337 He keeps 
calling the Church to listen to the poor, to accompany the poor, to advocate for the poor. And he 
indicts the affluent world, such as when he declared in his apostolic exhortation, Evangelii 
Gaudium, that economies of “exclusion and inequality” kill people.338 This is a prophetic and 
unpopular stance to take in the Western world where consumerism, capitalism and free markets 
are deeply rooted aspects of the culture. Such a culture anesthetizes its people to the suffering of 
the poor: 
The culture of prosperity deadens us; we are thrilled if the market offers us something 
new to purchase and in the meantime all those lives stunted for lack of opportunity seem 
a mere spectacle; they fail to move us.339 
Francis is engaging the culture in the way GS laid out. He looks at the signs of the times, sees 
where the Gospel still needs to call the culture to repentance and speaks out against the sin. He is 
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not withdrawing from the world, nor does he think action in this world is futile because sin is far 
too entrenched in society. He is calling the culture to greater conversion toward God. 
 This prophetic stance is particularly apparent around the issue of immigration. With the 
campaign and now election of President Donald Trump, the issue of illegal and undocumented 
immigration has come back to the forefront of the national consciousness. In 2013 Pope Francis 
presided at Mass at Lampadeusa upon an altar made of the wood of a ship that sunk while 
carrying immigrants across the sea. He attacked a “globalization of indifference” that ignores the 
plights of refugees and immigrants around the world.340 He called Western cultures to recognize 
their complicity in this social injustice and to enter into a deeper solidarity with the migrants and 
refugees. This deeper solidarity, this ability to allow their suffering to “echo in their hearts,” is a 
key part of this dialogue with culture.341 True dialogue requires deep listening, discerning the 
signs of the times, reflection, repentance and action to build up a more just world. 
 The conversionist model is very different from the cultural model at the extreme end of 
Niebuhr’s continuum. The cultural Christian uncritically baptizes whatever the cultural values 
are in the moment. In today’s world, many Westerners easily ignore the victims of free-market 
capitalism and unequal trade policies. The conversionist Christian, however, must discern 
cultural values that are always ambiguous. Capitalism has lifted billions of people out of poverty 
since the beginning of industrialization. However, it has also led to the impoverishment and 
death of billions more. By itself, without the guidance of the values of a proper Christian 
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humanism, society will not by itself seek the common good. Christians must be prophetic and 
stand up against the reigning cultural ideologies.  
 These cultural ideologies—in this case free-market capitalism and a general hostility 
toward immigrants—can become enshrined into the American Way of Life. Often, our “civil 
religion” can usurp our Christian values. A majority of Catholics who voted, after all, supported 
Trump despite his anti-immigration rhetoric.342 Francis’ decision to challenge American and 
European immigration policies is a direct attack upon this kind of capitulation to the culture. 
Like his predecessors, Francis accepts much that modernism has to offer, while providing 
prophetic critiques that may disrupt political harmonies.  
  Trump’s general “America First” nationalism is an example of the potential danger of 
civil religion. Civil religion, as a unifying force within society, is a necessary component in any 
political community. Individuals must feel a common bond to each other if they are to live 
together productively and in peace. However, if Christianity does not challenge the reigning 
cultural values, then it too can easily slip into the “Christ of Culture” model that has been so 
problematic in American history. This was often the case for mainline Protestant churches whose 
religious rhetoric was so often used for political ends. America was God’s chosen nation, a city 
upon a hill destined to spread democracy and freedom westward and then eventually around the 
globe. But as Pope Francis and others have pointed out, these cultural values that go 
unquestioned are often also the sources of great injustice and suffering. 
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 H. Richard Niebuhr refuses to declare that one of his models is better than another. But it 
is clear that the conversionist model is the best model for today’s liberal, pluralist society. The 
Church must constantly balance both being in the culture so that it can effectively speak to the 
culture with maintaining a prophetic tension with that culture. Such conflict will inevitably upset 
some members of the Church for whom the reigning cultural values are self-evidently correct. 
But the Christian’s ultimate loyalty must be to Christ, not to any culture, political leader or social 
arrangement. The “Christ the Transformer of Culture” model is never at home with being wholly 
“inside” or wholly “outside” the culture.  
Herberg realized that after World War II, the “American Way of Life” had become 
religiously pluralized. For the first time in the nation’s history, Catholics were no longer fighting 
to be considered true Americans. The institutional Church had withdrawn into its own immigrant 
enclaves, but at the same time it shared the general cultural ideology that he labelled the 
“American Way of Life.” This shared cultural understanding allowed the Church to be more and 
more integrated into the culture to the point that in 1960 the country elected the first Catholic 
President. By the end of Vatican II, the Church was no longer a nation of immigrants and, like 
their Protestant counterparts, Catholics had moved into the suburbs as their incomes increased.343 
The danger for the Church was no longer a sectarian withdrawal from the culture but rather a 
wholesale capitulation to it. The Church is called to be both “inside” the culture but also 
“outside,” at the center but also at the margins of society. The “Christ the Transformer of 
Culture” model is one way the Church has chosen to engage liberal social order in a way that 
avoids both sectarianism and a complete loss of its distinctive religious identity.   
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